Social Movements and Policy Implementation: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and the War on Poverty, 1965 to 1971

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This study of the Mississippi civil rights movement and the War on Poverty examines the relationship between social movements and policy implementation. A “movement infrastructure” model is developed that focuses on organizational structure, resources, and leadership to account for the impact of social movements on policy implementation. A two-tiered research design is employed that includes (1) a quantitative analysis of poverty programs in Mississippi counties from 1965 to 1971, and (2) case studies that show the complex interaction between the civil rights movement, resistance by whites, local powerholders, and federal agencies. The quantitative analysis shows that counties with strong movement infrastructures generated greater funding for Community Action Programs. The case studies show that movements were excluded from the initial formation of these programs as local whites attempted to preempt civil rights activists. However, in counties with strong movement infrastructures, activists were able to gain access to decision-making bodies and shape the content of poverty programs.

Social movement scholars agree that the question of a social movement’s impact on political change is important and understudied. Over the past four decades, leading scholars have reviewed the relevant literature on social movements and have noted the limited amount of systematic research on outcomes (Diani 1997; Eckstein 1965; Giugni 1998; Marx and Woods 1975; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988; Tarrow 1998). Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander (1995) observe that, “the field of social movements grew tremendously in the 1970s and 1980s, but the study of movement outcomes did not. . . . [The result is] that we still know very little about the impact of social movements on social change” (p. 276). Furthermore, the question of movement impact addresses one of the most important concerns of movement participants—the efficacy of social movements.

I have two major objectives in this paper. First, I provide a conceptual framework for analyzing movement outcomes. Most discussions focus on the analytic problems of establishing whether movements create change, but how movements generate political change must also be examined. I identify and compare the major theoretical models used to explain the relationship between movements and political change. I argue that our understanding of the influence of social movements will be greatly improved by delineating models that specify how movements generate institutional change (McAdam and Snow 1997). I propose a “movement infrastructure” model that fo-
cuses on the organizational structure, resources, and leadership of a movement to explain its impact on the political process. Second, I present an extensive analysis of the effects of the civil rights movement in Mississippi on the implementation of poverty programs at the local level. I investigate whether local movements directly and indirectly shaped the implementation of federal policy in Mississippi. First, a quantitative analysis of poverty program funding examines the impact of movement organization, white countermobilization, social, political, and economic factors on funding from 1965 to 1971. Two case studies follow that assess the impact of local civil rights movements on the form and content of poverty programs in their communities.

CONCEPTUALIZING MOVEMENT OUTCOMES

OUTCOMES AS CHANGES IN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

I focus on outcomes rather than success. Recent research has identified methodological and theoretical problems with studying success (Amenta and Young 1999; Giugni 1998). Success implies the attainment of specific, widely shared goals, but the goals of most social movements are contested by participants and observers. Goals also change over the course of a movement. Studying outcomes avoids these problems and allows scholars to focus on unintended and negative consequences as well as successes.

The analysis here pertains to political movements and institutional outcomes in the political arena. Political movements involve a sustained challenge to existing power relations, and they employ disruptive, nonroutine tactics that publicly challenge the distribution and uses of power in the broader society (Gamson 1990; McAdam 1982; Schwartz 1976; Tilly 1978). This focus excludes movements focused on changes internal to a group and its members. Because political movements also directly or indirectly make claims on the state, I focus on institutional outcomes. Typically, political movements attempt to build organizations and change the culture and consciousness of their members or the broader public. In fact, a movement’s impact on institutions often depends on its ability to build organizations and shape collective identities (Mueller 1987). These movements, however, seek change in political institutions, and those changes may take a variety of forms such as: (1) gaining access to the decision-making process, (2) altering an institution’s goals and priorities, (3) securing favorable policies, (4) insuring that those policies are implemented, or (5) shifting the distribution of institutional resources to benefit the movement’s constituents (Burstein et al. 1995; Gamson 1990; Kreisi et al. 1995; Schumaker 1975). Overall, a focus on institutional outcomes makes sense because it encompasses the long-term goals of many social movements. In addition, a focus on institutional outcomes has a methodological advantage because in many cases these outcomes are more easily measured than cultural, attitudinal, and psychological outcomes. Political outcomes provide an important indicator of “the results of [the civil rights] movement in the lives of black southerners” (Button 1989:4).

OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES, INSTITUTIONAL ARENAS, AND KEY ACTORS

Political process theories note that the emergence of social movements is patterned by broad changes in the “political opportunity structure” (McAdam 1982). This observation points to one of the methodological challenges for research on movement outcomes: If changes in the opportunity structure facilitate the emergence of a social movement, then those same changes may account for the apparent impact of a movement (Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein 1994). The importance of opportunity structures has been established, but few scholars would argue that they have a singular and deterministic effect on social movements (Goldstone 1980; Kitschelt 1986). Rather, the emergence and maintenance of a social movement is in part attributable to the internal dynamics of the movement.
movement itself. In addition, some scholars argue that the impacts of movements on opportunity structures should be studied. For example, McAdam (1996) notes that “our collective failure to undertake any serious accounting of the effect of past movements on . . . political opportunities is as puzzling as it is lamentable” (p. 36).

Any analysis of movement outcomes must examine the structure and strategies of the relevant exogenous political actors and institutions. Movements make claims that directly or indirectly impinge on other groups. Thus, movements have complex and sometimes unexpected relationships with other groups that become allies or opponents. They also mobilize within institutional settings that structure conflict and possible outcomes. For example, federal agencies are constrained by their relationship to Congress and public opinion (Burstein 1999). These rules and resources shape the possible responses of state actors to social movements.

**Measuring Outcomes Over Time**

For methodological and conceptual reasons, I need to measure multiple outcomes and to measure outcomes over time (Andrews 1997; Banaszak 1996; Button 1989; Snyder and Kelly 1979). Movement outcomes over time must be measured because movements change their tactics and goals. For example, Katzenstein (1990) finds that feminist activists in 1973 organized around the issue of ordination, but by 1983 the movement had broadened its analysis and goals to include “running shelters for homeless women; doing prison work; organizing in the sanctuary movement; joining in protests against US intervention in Central America; running empowerment workshops, lesbian retreats, and conferences to build bridges between women religious and laywomen” (p. 41; also see Katzenstein 1998). Another reason for measuring outcomes over time is that the form and degree of influence may vary over time (Andrews 1997). By focusing on a movement’s immediate impact the movement’s influence could be over- or underestimated.

In sum, analyzing movement outcomes involves: (1) examining different forms of political change (e.g., access, policy enactment, implementation), (2) analyzing opportunity structures, institutional arenas and key actors that shape movement dynamics, (3) incorporating temporal processes by measuring outcomes over time.

**FOUR DIVERGENT VIEWS ON MOVEMENTS AND OUTCOMES**

Studies of the impact of social movements have typically focused on the question of whether movements exert influence. In those cases for which one can identify the influence of movements on institutional change independent of other nonmovement factors, a second set of questions must be answered. First, the causal argument must be specified. What characteristics of a movement or movement activity account for the impact? Second, the mechanisms of influence must be revealed. What is the process or mechanism by which a movement influences a political institution? There are several prominent answers to these questions.

Analyses of movement outcomes will be improved by systematically comparing and elaborating these contending models. In my view, no single model can account for the ways movements generate change. This view stems from the variety of cases and political contexts that have been studied as “social movements.” Nevertheless, there is a relatively limited set of possibilities, and our understanding of movement impacts will be improved by specifying those models as “ideal types.” Scholars often operate with an implicit model that remains under theorized. Elaborating these models allows researchers to ask how particular cases diverge from the theoretical models. Most important, comparing different models can direct scholarship toward broader questions about variation across movements and political contexts.²

I delineate four major approaches to the relationship between movements and outcomes.³ Each model singles out key ele-

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² For example, Piven and Cloward’s (1977) explicit focus on “poor people’s movements” suggests that class composition is a key variable (also see Ragin 1989).

³ I focus on theories that explicitly examine the movement/outcome relationship. Other than my
ments that account for a movement’s impact, and each implies different mechanisms through which movements can exert influence. These distinct ways of thinking about movement impact are rarely made explicit or contrasted with one another in sociological research. By explicating each, I aim to clarify the lines of debate in the field and place my research within that debate.

**Action-Reaction Models: Disruption or Persuasion**

In the first two models, which I call “action-reaction” models, mobilization has the momentary potential to leverage change through its impact on political elites, electoral coalitions, or public opinion. Within the action-reaction approach, theorists describe two possible routes whereby movements are influential.

In one route, movements are dramatic, disruptive and threatening to elites, which prompts a rapid response—typically either concessions and/or repression. Piven and Cloward (1977) have been the primary proponents of this view arguing that “the most useful way to think about the effectiveness of protest is to examine the disruptive effects on institutions of different forms of mass defiance, and then to examine the political reverberations of those disruptions” (p. 24). For Piven and Cloward (1977), it is not clear that protest has an independent impact because it “wells up in response to momentous changes in the institutional order. It is not created by organizers and leaders” (p. 36). Protest is one link in a sequence, and once the sequence is initiated protesters have little control over the policy response. The authors conclude that “whatever influence lower-class groups occasionally exert in American politics does not result from organization, but from mass protest and the disruptive consequences of protest” (Piven and Cloward 1977:36).

Organizations, particularly mass-based membership organizations, are doomed to failure because powerless groups can never mobilize as effectively as dominant groups in a society. As a result, organization can only lessen the disruptive capacity and efficacy of protest (Piven and Cloward 1984, 1992; also see Gamson and Schneider 1984; Morris 1984). Elite reaction is ultimately focused in a self-interested way on ending protest. Analyzing urban policy changes in the 1960s, Katzenelson (1981) argues that “the targets of these public policies were not objects of compassion, but of fear born of uncertainty” (p. 3). Policy-makers caught off guard by protest, attempt to quickly assemble a strategy of repression, concessions, or a combination of the two that will end the protest wave (Tarrow 1993). Disruption models focus on the limitations of protest on policymaking beyond the agenda-setting stage.

In the second version of the action-reaction model, movements are dramatic and generate support from sympathetic third parties that take up the cause of the movement. The intervening role of “third parties,” “bystander publics,” or “conscience constituents” is critical. In a classic essay, Lipsky (1968) argues that “the problem of the powerless in protest activity is to activate ‘third parties’ to enter the implicit or explicit bargaining arena in ways favorable to protesters” (p. 1145). Lipsky claims that “if protest tactics are not considered significant by the media . . . protest organizations will not succeed. Like the tree falling unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected” (p. 1151; also see Benford and Hunt 1992).  

Garrow (1978) argues that civil rights campaigns, especially in Selma, Alabama, generated momentum for the 1965 Voting Rights Act. For some theorists, repression is an intervening link. For example, Garrow

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4 These models of movement influence are connected to methodological strategies. For example, Rucht and Neidhardt (1998) argue that media reported protest is a meaningful barometer of all protest: “Insofar as we are interested in those protests which are an input for the political system, media reported protests have a higher validity than the whole range of actual protests” (p. 76).
argues that attacks by southern officials on civil rights activists further solidified the support of bystanders. Burstein (1985) shows that the movement did not reverse the direction of public opinion arguing that movements are probably unable to have such a substantial impact on opinion. Rather, protest increased the salience of the civil rights issue, and political representatives were able to act on those louder and clearer signals (Burstein 1999). In this view protest is a form of communication, and persuasion is the major way that movements influence policy (Mansbridge 1994).

These two versions of the action-reaction model differ: The first emphasizes disruptive and often violent action forcing a response from political elites; the second proposes that protest can mobilize sympathetic third parties that advance the movement’s agenda by exerting influence on political elites. But both versions of the action-reaction model share the assumption that (1) large-scale dramatic events shape the process of change by, (2) mobilizing more powerful actors to advance the movement’s cause, and (3) that (implicitly) movements have little or no direct influence beyond this initial point. In both versions, the primary focus is on public protest events rather than on organizations.

**Access-Influence Model:**
**Routinization of Protest**

The third major approach argues that the determinant of movement efficacy is the acquisition of routine access to the polity through institutionalized tactics. This approach typically describes a drift toward less disruptive tactics such as electoral politics, coalitions, lobbying and litigation. Organization and leadership figure prominently in this model. Organizational changes parallel the tactical shift including increasing centralization and bureaucratization of movement organizations. In short, social movement organizations evolve into interest groups. In the “access-influence” model, the organizational and tactical shifts are accompanied by an increase in influence over relevant policy arenas. In contrast, the action-reaction model would predict that movement influence declines as tactics become routinized and organizations become incorporated. Most important, the access-influence model argues that disruptive tactics have little independent impact on institutional change. In their study of the impacts of black and Hispanic political mobilization on a variety of policy outcomes, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) argue that protest and electoral strategies were used together effectively, but “demand-protest strategies by themselves produced limited results in most cities” (p. 246).

Access-influence models also assert that securing insider status is more consequential than pursuing a single, specific policy objective. Rochon and Mazmanian (1993) argue that the antinuclear movement, by advocating a single piece of legislation, was unsuccessful. In contrast, the environmental movement, especially antitoxic groups, attempted to become a legitimate participant in the regulatory process. By gaining access, the movement has been able to have a substantial, long-term impact on policy (also see Costain 1981; Sabatier 1975).

The access-influence model has fewer proponents within the movement literature than the action-reaction models. However, the notion that “routine” tactics are most efficacious is consistent with pluralist theories of democracy that view the political system as relatively open to citizen influence. In this model, organization-building (especially professionalization, bureaucratization, and centralization) provides movements with the necessary tools to operate in the interest group system where bargaining is the key mechanism of influence.

**The Movement Infrastructure Model**

Finally, I propose a “movement infrastructure” model. Three components of a movement’s infrastructure must be examined to explain its influence on the policy process: leadership, organizational structure, and resources. Infrastructures that allow the movement to employ multiple mechanisms of influence (including disruption, persuasion, and bargaining) will have the greatest impact on policy implementation. At a general level, the autonomy and continuity of the infrastructure are key factors explaining the long-
term viability and impact of the movement, sustaining a movement through shifts in the broader political environment (Andrews 1997; Rupp and Taylor 1990). A strong movement infrastructure can spur political elites to initiate policy concessions in response to the perceived threat of the movement. That threat rests on the belief that a movement has the capacity to institute more substantial change through parallel, autonomous institutions.

Leaders and organizations must be embedded in indigenous, informal networks. Such links make leaders more responsive to their constituency and less easily co-opted (Morris 1984). Robnett (1996) distinguishes between formal leaders (e.g., ministers) and an intermediate layer of “bridge leaders,” who stand at nodal points within the informal networks of a community. This type of leadership structure can generate ongoing tension within a movement. However, it also can provide advantages, such as innovation (Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 1995). A differentiated leadership structure allows for communication to various audiences including participants, potential recruits, opponents, and state actors (Klanderman 1997). A leadership structure with a diversity of skills and experiences will be better able to use mass-based tactics as well as routine negotiation with outside groups (Ganz 2000; Gerlach and Hine 1970).

The critical role of preexisting organization and resources has been established in the emergence of social movements. To persist over time, movements must forge new organizational forms and establish independent resource flows (McAdam 1982; Schwartz 1976). In the mobilization process, the informal structure of relationships among activists and organizations must be expansive across communities and subgroups. In the policymaking process, formal organizations become a necessary vehicle for advancing a group’s claims. Organizational structures can alter the routine operation of the political process when they are perceived as legitimate and/or threatening by established political actors (Clemens 1997; Gamson 1990).

Movements that rely primarily on the “mobilization of people” rather than on financial resources are more likely to continue using protest tactics (Schwartz and Paul 1992). As a result, their strategic and tactical options are broader (Ganz 2000). Ultimately, movements require substantial contributions of volunteer labor to maintain organizations and launch protest campaigns. This is seen most clearly at the local level where movement organizations are less likely to maintain a paid, professional staff.

In the movement infrastructure model, strategy and tactics depend on a movement’s leadership, organization, and resources. This contrasts with the action-reaction model that either views protest and organization in conflict with one another or pays little attention to organization. Strategy and tactics are conceptualized broadly in the infrastructure model and range from protest to the building of counter-institutions.

In sum, strong movement infrastructures have diverse leaders and a complex leadership structure, multiple organizations, informal ties that cross geographic and social boundaries, and a resource base that draws substantially on contributions from their members for both labor and money. These characteristics provide movements with greater flexibility that allows them to influence the policy process through multiple mechanisms.

**COMPARING THE MODELS**

The movement infrastructure model builds on the insights of the prior three models. First, it assumes, like the action-reaction models, that there are key moments when movements can be especially efficacious. Further, it assumes that disruptive tactics are important for movements to have an impact, especially when disruptive tactics are creatively injected into routine political processes. The movement infrastructure model differs from the others because it emphasizes the building and sustaining of movement infrastructures as an important determinant of the long-term impact of these movements (in contrast to short-term impacts, like agenda-setting). Furthermore, unlike the access-influence model, these organizations have the greatest impact when they maintain their ability to use both “outsider” and “insider” tactics. Litigation, lobbying, and electoral politics can be effectively employed by social movements. However, movements lose
key opportunities for leverage in the political process when they quickly adopt the tactics of “interest groups” and abandon “insurgent” tactics.

Movements must be able to create leverage through multiple mechanisms. The prior three models focus on a single mechanism as the primary means by which movements create change (e.g., disruption, persuasion, or negotiation). The movement infrastructure model accounts for the ability of movements to impact political change through multiple mechanisms, and this change can occur when a movement’s leadership and organization allow for strategic flexibility.

The pattern of outcomes for a movement may depend on processes described by each of these models. For example, both action-reaction models focus on agenda-setting as the primary outcome that movements can influence. In contrast, access-influence and movement infrastructure models examine later stages in the policymaking process. Ultimately, researchers should use these models to compare across different types of social movements and political contexts. The analysis I present here demonstrates the utility of the movement infrastructure model as applied to the Mississippi case.

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

**The War on Poverty as an Outcome**

The War on Poverty created a new set of opportunities and constraints for the civil rights movement. These programs brought substantial resources into impoverished communities, providing opportunities for blacks to influence the shape and direction of policy. At first glance, it is surprising how thoroughly local movements became involved in the War on Poverty. After all, the publicly stated goal of the movement in the early 1960s was gaining access to electoral politics. However, an underlying objective of the movement in Mississippi was building local movements that could define and pursue their own goals (Payne 1995). The early movement organizations were not directly involved in the War on Poverty. Nevertheless, local movements continued to operate in the post-1965 period and attempted to shape the local implementation of poverty programs. Many local activists defined economic empowerment as a natural outgrowth of the political empowerment pursued through voter registration. In fact, many believed that political power would be meaningless unless black communities could generate viable economic programs (Dorsey 1977).

There were several obstacles to movement influence. First, the objectives of federal agencies constrained the ability of local movements to direct the War on Poverty. The “professionalization of reform” could reduce the participation and influence of the poor to a primarily symbolic role (Helfgott 1974; also see Friedland 1976). In addition, the administration of poverty programs required negotiations with many community groups, some of which were potential allies or opponents of civil rights activists. While movement mobilization shaped the distribution and development of antipoverty programs in Mississippi, these programs also shaped the direction of local movements. Once the War on Poverty was initiated, local movements in Mississippi and across the country attempted to secure resources and shape programs (Patterson 1994:146). Quadagno (1994) notes that a “crucial linkage... unquestionably did develop between the civil rights movement and the War on Poverty” (p. 28).

The poverty programs in Mississippi can be examined as an outcome of the civil rights movement for four main reasons: (1) the poverty programs and the civil rights movement both targeted an overlapping arena of activity, (2) there was substantial and ongoing interactions between civil rights activists and the Office of Economic Opportunity, (3) the programs provided benefits to the movement’s primary constituency (blacks in the South), and (4) there is significant variation across states and counties in local actors’ influence on the programs.

**Study Design: Quantitative and Qualitative Analyses**

Mississippi is an important case for examining the long-term impacts of the civil rights

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5 I do not analyze the impacts of poverty programs on the civil rights movement, e.g., whether the programs co-opted the movement (see Eisinger 1979).
movement. The state is widely known for its institutionalization of the “tripartite system of domination”—a term Morris (1984) has used to describe the political, economic, and personal bases of racial inequality in the U.S. South. On one hand, Mississippi can be viewed as a test case where the movement met its most intense resistance. At the same time, there is substantial variation within the state across key variables: movement mobilization, countermovement, structural characteristics, and the implementation of poverty programs.

Follow Amenta’s (1991) suggestion of analyzing subunits, I use counties as the unit of analysis to strengthen the theoretical value of the study. This focus has substantive merit because the Mississippi movement targeted counties as areas within which to organize. In addition, counties are the most important local political unit in the South (Krane and Shaffer 1992). Finally, poverty programs were instituted in Mississippi across counties rather than across municipalities.

The research here combines two complementary strategies: (1) a quantitative analysis of Mississippi counties that allows for precise estimates of the distribution of programs and funding, and (2) qualitative evidence from case studies using interview and archival data. Most previous research on the War on Poverty has focused on urban areas, riots, and the distribution of poverty programs (Button 1978; Fording 1997). Beyond single case studies, few scholars have examined the impacts of social movement processes on poverty programs. In my quantitative analysis, I ask whether movements had an impact on poverty programs independent of other relevant factors. After establishing that movements did have an impact on pov-

6 The data set is drawn from a larger study that includes measures of the civil rights movement, local countermobilization, contextual variables, federal intervention, and other outcomes. This data set includes all Mississippi counties except Hinds County, which includes Jackson, the capitol of Mississippi. The large size of Hinds County makes it an outlier in some analyses. In addition, Jackson served as the organizational center for state-level activities. My interest is in the local forms of mobilization, and in Hinds County these cannot be distinguished from state-level mobilization.

7 For overviews see Friedman (1977), Patterson (1994), Piven and Cloward (1993), and Quadagno (1994).
more conservative agencies, and in 1973 OEO was eliminated (Quadagno 1994).

Among the various poverty programs, the Community Action Program (CAP) received the greatest attention and became almost synonymous with the War on Poverty. Policymakers pushing “community action hoped to stimulate better coordination among the melange of public and private agencies delivering social services” (Peterson and Greenstone 1977:241). This objective, however, was abandoned in favor of “citizen participation.” OEO and local CAPs had little impact on the established agencies providing services to poor communities. As a result, CAPs administered many of the new antipoverty programs. CAPs were coordinated at the local level through a CAP Board that served as the overarching administrative body and provided a point of potential access for local movements. This opening paved the way for intense conflicts between local groups attempting to gain access to CAP boards in order to influence the flow of OEO funds.

**The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement**

In Mississippi, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) began developing community projects in the early 1960s around voter registration (Carson 1981; Dittmer 1994; Payne 1995). These early projects linked the small network of indigenous NAACP leaders and an emerging group of grassroots leaders exemplified by Annie Devine, Fannie Lou Hamer, and Victoria Gray (Payne 1995). Civil rights projects met intense repression across the state from local law enforcement and local whites. SNCC’s early efforts were expanded during the 1964 Freedom Summer project that brought college students from across the country into the local movements. Two features of this early period stand out: (1) the intensity of white resistance and (2) the focus on building local community organizations and leaders.

Following Freedom Summer, the newly formed Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) challenged the all-white Mississippi delegation to the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City. This is often portrayed as the final chapter of the Mississippi movement as national attention shifted away from the southern movement following passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. However, key struggles took place at the state and local levels concerning the implementation of voting rights and social policies. Both the NAACP and MFDP continued to pursue a civil rights agenda after 1965 in Mississippi. The period following the Atlantic City convention was marked by increasing conflict between the two dominant organizations. In the electoral arena, both organizations supported candidates in local and state elections. Local branches of both organizations pursued school desegregation, organized boycotts and demonstrations, and pushed for expanded poverty programs in their communities (McLemore 1971; Parker 1990).

**The Child Development Group of Mississippi: Early Involvement in the War on Poverty**

From their origins, poverty programs in Mississippi were closely tied to the dynamics of the civil rights movement. One of the earliest and most celebrated programs, the Child Development Group of Mississippi (CDGM), administered Head Start centers across the

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state building directly on the movement’s base of Freedom Schools and community centers. CDGM provided an entry point for activists into the War on Poverty (Greenberg 1969).

CDGM was formed by a small group of policymakers and psychologists with loose connections to the Mississippi movement. For example, Tom Levin, the first director of the program, had participated in Freedom Summer through the Medical Committee for Human Rights, a group providing medical assistance to local projects. Despite these ties, when proposals for CDGM were circulated in early 1965, the response from SNCC and MFDIP’s state-level leadership was one of skepticism and opposition (Payne 1995). Many movement leaders were suspicious of the federal government and the initiatives of white liberals following the challenge at Atlantic City (Dittmer 1994). Thus, the state-level civil rights organizations made little effort to support CDGM.

Nevertheless, CDGM quickly diffused through the local movement infrastructure. In April 1965, CDGM held its first statewide meeting to begin developing the organization for the upcoming summer. At the first meeting, representatives from 20 communities attended. By the second meeting in the middle of April, that number had increased to 64 (Greenberg 1969:18, 22). For the first summer, Payne (1995) reports that “on opening day of the eight-week session, eighty-four centers opened across the state, serving fifty-six hundred children” (p. 329). Greenberg (1969), the OEO staff person responsible for CDGM, claims that “CDGM stood on the shoulders of COFO and its companion projects which were active the preceding summer” (p. 28).

Holmes County illustrates the relationship that developed between the civil rights movement and CDGM at the local level. An inspection during the second year of the program found that 102 of the 108 staff members in Holmes County were active members of MFDIP. Reflecting the strength of the local movement, the investigation found that “many of the Negroes in the communities around the centers have donated money and time to build buildings for the centers and work with the programs” (NA, RG 381, Box 108, July 30, 1966).8 Bernice Johnson, who worked with CDGM in Holmes County, recalled that community centers were used in the daytime for Head Start and at night for the MFDIP (Bernice Johnson, interviewed by author, June 20, 1996). The same core groups of activists participated in both activities. Investigations across the state showed that CDGM staff were affiliated with COFO, SNCC, CORE, NAACP, the Urban League, the Delta Ministry, and MFDIP (NA, RG 381, Box 108, July 5, 1966).

The strong relationship between local movements and CDGM made the Head Start program a target of opposition, including violence. The primary resistance came from influential Mississippi politicians, including Senator James Eastland, who chaired the Judiciary Committee, and Senator John Stennis, who chaired the Appropriations Committee. The opposition to CDGM resonated with growing fear from around the country that the War on Poverty was funding black insurgency (Quadagno 1994).

CDGM acquired its second grant for the 1966 summer after a massive mobilization including a demonstration in which “forty-eight black children and their teachers turned the hearing room of the House Education and Labor Committee into a kindergarten” (Dittmer 1994:375). After this, CDGM was funded at 5.6 million dollars. In response,

Governor Johnson and his allies came to see that by setting up CAP agencies in Mississippi communities, local whites could prevent the flow of federal dollars into programs like CDGM. Under continuing attack from segregationists, OEO was eager to recognize any CAP agency in Mississippi, regardless of its composition. (Dittmer 1994:375)

This tactical shift is remarkable—that Mississippi politicians opposed to federal anti-poverty programs would come to embrace them must be attributed to the threat posed by the Mississippi civil rights movement.9

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8 Complete citations for archival material are listed in the bibliography under Archival Sources. “NA” indicates the National Archives and Records Administration, and “RG indicates the Record Group.

9 This opposition to federal intervention was specific to programs that would benefit black
OEO undermined the viability of CDGM by stipulating that in counties with a CAP, Head Start must be administered through the local CAP agency rather than a specialized, statewide program like CDGM. Turning Head Start over to CAPs gave local agencies a high profile in the community. The policy also undermined the movement’s control of Head Start in Mississippi. OEO realized that this would shift the attention of movement activists toward local CAPs. In November 1966, OEO’s southeast regional director wrote to OEO director Sargent Shriver explaining that “CDGM . . . had a large number of local poor people involved or hired. These same people can be expected to become involved in local CA[P] activities as their concern or experience warrants” (NA, RG 381, Box 2, November 8, 1966). This became the main battleground as activists attempted to shape Community Action Programs in Mississippi.

MEASURES AND MODELS: THE FORMATION AND FUNDING OF CAPS

Community Action Programs became the central component of the War on Poverty. Did local movements in Mississippi shape the formation and funding of CAPs? If so, in what ways did they influence CAPs? I analyze the funding of Community Action Programs during two phases, the initial development phase from 1965 to 1968 and the later phase of declining resources from 1969 to 1971.10 The dependent variable is the amount of CAP funding for each period. The independent variables include measures of the civil rights movement (black mobilization), white resistance to the movement (countermobilization), and local characteristics of the county (political and socioeconomic variables). (See Appendix Table A for a list of variables, descriptions, means and standard deviations.)

Black mobilization is measured by three variables. MFDP staff in 1965 and NAACP membership in 1963 distinguishes between the effects of the militant (MFDP) and moderate (NAACP) wings of the Mississippi civil rights movement. I measure black electoral mobilization by the number of black candidates running for office in 1967. Few black candidates won in these initial elections following the Voting Rights Act. However, the variable indicates the early consolidation of organizations and networks focused on electoral politics.

Countermobilization by whites is measured by three variables: incidents of violent resistance during Freedom Summer, the presence of a Citizens’ Council organization, and the presence of a Ku Klux Klan organization in the county.11 The formation of a Community Action Program required some support and participation from local whites, typically from the County Board of Supervisors. Hence, the areas that had most strongly resisted the civil rights movement should be the least likely to seek out or support federal programs. In some counties, for example, local whites became targets of repression if they met with civil rights groups (Dittmer 1994; Harris 1982).

Political characteristics of the county are examined in terms of the political orientation of the electorate and the organizational capacity of the local government. The partisan loyalty of a county’s electorate is measured by the percentage of votes cast for Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Higher levels of Democratic loyalty may have been rewarded similar results; I report the analysis using the “proportional” estimates. Because participation in programs was based on economic eligibility, this strategy is a better, if not perfect, approximation of the distribution.

10 The two dependent variables are the total CAP grants for 1965–1968 and 1969–1971 (NA, RG 381, Box 14, n.d.). There were 18 CAPs in Mississippi from 1965 to 1971 of which 8 were multicounty agencies. I used two different strategies for estimating county-level expenditures for multicounty agencies. First, I divided the budget evenly among the counties covered by the CAP. For the second estimation, I divided the budget among the counties proportional to the number of households in each county with an income below $3,000 per year. The two estimates produced

11 These three variables are not highly correlated, and thus I treat them as distinct modalities of resistance.
with higher levels of funding. In addition, I examine the possible influence of local political institutions on program implementation by including the proportion of the labor force employed in local government in 1964. I expect that counties with large political institutions will be more likely to seek out poverty program funding because of their greater organizational capacity (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983).

Socioeconomic characteristics that might influence the formation and funding of CAPs include the local class structure, the level of poverty, and the population size. I examine the local class structure using three different indicators: (1) the proportion of the labor force employed in manufacturing, (2) the proportion of the labor force employed as professionals, and (3) landowner concentration for commercial farms. Measures of class structure are often used in studies of the policy process. James (1988) finds that manufacturing is a key component of the southern class structure that influences the level of racial inequality in political participation. Hence, I expect manufacturing to have a negative impact on poverty program funding. Professionals were potential supporters of poverty programs, so I expect the proportion employed as professionals to have a positive impact on CAP funding. The measure of landholding concentration estimates the predominance of the traditional plantation economy. Roscigno and Tomaskovic-Devey (1994) find that a similar indicator is an important determinant of local political outcomes in North Carolina. The expected direction of the relationship with this variable is unclear: While southern planters historically had opposed extensions of the welfare state system into the local economy, the mechanization of farming coincided with the rise of the civil rights movement and the initiation of the War on Poverty. This left many farm laborers unemployed, and poverty programs could have been viewed as a viable strategy for addressing the social and economic consequences of technological change (Cobb 1990).

To measure poverty, I use the proportion of households with incomes below $3,000 per year. In these models, using households or individuals produces similar results because they are highly correlated ($r = .994$). I also include a variable measuring the total number of households. To measure poverty and the number of households, I use data from the 1960 census (rather than 1970) because OEO would have used these data at the time. (Analyses using the 1970 data provide similar results.)

The initial models were estimated using OLS regression. However, in the final models I conduct an additional test using a “spatial error” model, which tests for spatial dependence in the model that can result from the geographic proximity of the units of analysis (see Amenta et al. 1994; Gould 1991). The presence of spatial dependence can lead to inflated significance tests (Anselin 1992; Doreian 1980). The autocorrelation term in both models is statistically significant. However, the profile of results for the remaining independent variables is similar to that in the OLS models.

RESULTS

BLACK MOBILIZATION AND COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAMS

Table 2 shows that the measures of black mobilization play an important role in the funding of Community Action Programs during both periods: The MFDP has a statis-

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12 Similarly, I tested several measures of poverty, such as the number of households with income below $2,000 and $1,000 in these models. Each indicator produced comparable results. The chosen indicator, households earning less than $3,000, is the closest approximation of the federal poverty line. CAP grant applications required that applicants list the percentage of households earning below $3,000. When OEO investigated the composition of CAP boards or program employees to determine whether there was sufficient representation of “the poor,” this was the indicator they used. The indicator became so widely used that the movement employed it, and in 1966, MFDP sent out a call for a statewide meeting of all persons earning below $3,000. Studies by political scientists and sociologists measuring poverty with 1960 data have also employed this same indicator (e.g., Colby 1985; Cowart 1969; Friedland 1976).

13 The independent variables that were significant in the OLS models remain significant, with the exception of the presence of Ku Klux Klan organizations.
Table 2. Unstandardized Coefficients from the Maximum-Likelihood Regression of Community Action Program Funding (in $100,000s) on Selected Independent Variables: Mississippi Counties, 1965–1968 and 1969–1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black Mobilization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFDP membership, 1965</td>
<td>1.942*** (.506)</td>
<td>1.109*** (.243)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAACP membership, 1963 (logged)</td>
<td>1.646** (.715)</td>
<td>.451 (.350)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of black candidates, 1967</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>.566** (.211)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Countermobilization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent resistance during Freedom Summer</td>
<td>-1.96*** (.577)</td>
<td>-1.240*** (.283)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens’ Council organization in county, 1956</td>
<td>-1.657 (2.401)</td>
<td>-.657 (1.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ku Klux Klan organization in county, 1964</td>
<td>-2.622 (2.324)</td>
<td>-1.707 (1.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage voting for Lyndon Johnson, 1964</td>
<td>-.011 (.199)</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion employed in local government, 1964</td>
<td>690.229* (327.970)</td>
<td>415.988** (156.610)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socioeconomic Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion employed in manufacturing</td>
<td>-.025 (.205)</td>
<td>-.090 (.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion professionals</td>
<td>.431 (.374)</td>
<td>.131 (.176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landowner concentration</td>
<td>5.251 (7.432)</td>
<td>.107 (3.357)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty, 1959 (proportion of households earning less than $3,000)</td>
<td>43.769* (25.408)</td>
<td>11.447 (12.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of households, 1960 (in 1,000s)</td>
<td>.907* (.424)</td>
<td>.760*** (.206)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial autocorrelation (λ)</td>
<td>.551*** (.114)</td>
<td>.383** (.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fit</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximized log-likelihood (LIK)</td>
<td>-1,226.3</td>
<td>-1,165.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)</td>
<td>2,478.6</td>
<td>2,356.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. “Fit” measures the squared correlation between the predicted and observed values (Anselin 1992). Number of counties = 81.

*p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001 (one-tailed tests [except landowner concentration; see text])

Typically significant effect in both periods, the NAACP variable is significant for 1965–1968 but not for 1969–1971, and the measure of black electoral organization is positive and statistically significant for 1969–1971.14

The models underscore the influence at the local level of the more militant organizations. Quadagno (1994) argues that “OEO promoted black moderates at the expense of more militant civil rights activists” (p. 43). Certainly, OEO attempted to do this. But these analyses show that local movements, especially militant groups, promoted the expansion of OEO programs.

Next I discuss the remaining variables in the CAP models. Then I provide an extended discussion of movement influence. I argue that we must look further to determine whether movement activists, moderate or militant, played a direct role in the administration of CAPs. I draw on two case studies of Mississippi counties to examine how movements shaped poverty program formation and funding.

14 The black candidate variable does not account for the declining importance of NAACP membership. Models omitting the black candidate variable show a similar profile of coefficients, and the NAACP variable remains nonsignificant.
**Countermobilization:**
**Repression and Poverty Programs**

The negative coefficients for violent resistance during Freedom Summer are statistically significant in both models. Less CAP funding went to those locales that had been sites of the most militant resistance to the civil rights movement. One white leader in Coahoma County articulated the common view that “if the white leaders did not become involved then the alternative was more Federal intervention with the county’s anti-poverty program being turned over to the Negroes” (Mosley and Williams 1967:8). Most counties had some white leaders who shared this view, but they did not prevail in counties that had high levels of violent repression. Local white moderates were the targets of white violence in some counties, but in counties that were relatively less repressive, moderate white leaders stepped forward to form poverty programs.

This interpretation is supported by evidence from the case studies and broader historical material on the civil rights movement (see Cunnigen 1987; Jacoway and Colburn 1982). In those cases in which local whites supported the civil rights movement, they were often singled out for repression. For example, during Freedom Summer, the Heffners, a white couple, met with civil rights activists in their home in McComb. After this meeting, the Heffners were intimidated until they left the state (Dittmer 1994; Harris 1982). This type of repression was not limited to Freedom Summer. In 1966, for example, a white Head Start teacher in Panola County “received threatening phone calls. On July 16, a letter was distributed around the city of Batesville. It was signed KKK, listed some of the white teachers and aides working in the program and said they would be given just one more opportunity to get out on their own. . . . As a result of the threat, four white aides left the Head Start program” (NA, RG 381, Box 110, July 17, 1966). OEO field reports and CDGM records document similar efforts to limit white support for the movement and the poverty programs.

Movement scholars often argue that repression has a negative impact on a movement’s ability to achieve its objectives (Gamson 1990). This can occur when repression undermines the organizational capacity of the movement, but in this case, I argue that a different process is operating—repression diminished CAP funding by suppressing the mobilization of other groups.

**The Local Context:**
**Political Variables and Poverty**

The pattern reported in Table 2 indicates that poverty was significantly associated with high levels of CAP funding during the first period only. County size (measured by the number of households) also has a positive effect in both models. The proportion employed in local government has a positive and statistically significant relationship to poverty program funding in both periods. Partisanship and social class measures do not show statistically significant effects on poverty program funding.

Most CAPs were initiated in the early years following the 1964 legislation. As budget cuts were made through the late 1960s, the funding of new grants was minimal. OEO’s broad guideline was to make reductions of “approximately equal percentage” while allowing room for administrative discretion (NA, RG 381, Box 2, October 14, 1966). However, Table 2 reveals some important shifts, including the declining role of poverty and the increasing role of county size (measured by number of households). Overall, the results reported in Table 2 indicate that there was some continuity in the funding of CAPs.

**Local Movements and Community Action Programs**

The key finding from the regression models, then, is the significant positive impact of

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15 The relationship between repression and protest has received considerable attention in recent years and has been strongly influenced by Tilly’s (1978) early analysis (Koopmans 1997; Lichbach 1987; Rasler 1996). In contrast, little is known about the impact of repression on outcomes.

16 I conducted a third case study that sheds light on this process. In Madison County, violent repression endured longer than it did in most of Mississippi. Only one effort was made to estab-
black mobilization on the funding of CAPs. However, this finding is consistent with different interpretations. One possibility is that local movements were directly involved in the formation of CAPs. However, another possibility is that movements posed a threat that mobilized other groups in the county to develop poverty programs. These scenarios correspond to Gamson’s (1990) concepts of success and preemption: Success occurs when movements gain access to the policymaking process and generate substantive gains; movements are preempted when substantive gains are achieved without access to the policymaking process.\(^ {17} \)

The regression equations do not indicate which of the two interpretations apply in Mississippi. The case studies show that the pattern was more complex. Initially movements were preempted, and this was followed by long struggles with varying degrees of success to achieve access to the policymaking process. Movements gained influence by employing multiple strategies such as disruptive protest, negotiation with OEO officials, and administering independent poverty programs. In short, the movement infrastructure in the community shaped the extent and form of influence that was ultimately achieved.

In 1965 and 1966, Community Action Programs were formed without substantial participation from movement activists. Black participation often involved traditional leaders not affiliated with the civil rights movements (neither the moderate NAACP nor the more militant MFDP representatives), such as ministers and teachers. OEO was, in fact, aware of what it called the “Tom” problem. In early 1966, the southeast regional manager of CAP reported that in Mississippi . . . the most frequent problem and the one which requires the most time in its solution is representation. Boards on original submission are almost always hand-picked and packed in favor of the Governor. Negro representation is always ‘Tom.’ . . . Protests almost always follow the selection of such initial Boards and resolution generally takes from 3 to 4 months. (NA, RG 381, Box 2, February 24, 1966)\(^ {18} \)

Even though they were aware of the problem, OEO’s grant administrators often did not have detailed information about the local situation and lacked “the technical competence necessary to help with Board problems” (NA, RG 381, Box 2, February 24, 1966). This problem was particularly acute in the early years. During this period, OEO depended on local movements to act as “whistle-blowers.”

THE CASE STUDIES

The Community Action Programs in Holmes and Bolivar Counties were formed with little direct involvement from activists. However, this changed as each movement attempted to influence local CAPs. The cases differ with regard to the specific strategies deployed by local movements and the way that local elites responded to those efforts. In Holmes County, activists were able to secure positions and influence within the CAP administration and staff. In Bolivar County, activists used a variety of tactics to establish an independent poverty program that operated alongside the local CAP.

Holmes County

In the early 1960s, Holmes County developed one of the most successful local civil rights movements in Mississippi (MacLeod 1991; Payne 1995). The movement developed an infrastructure with broad leadership, multiple organizations, indigenous resources, and strategic flexibility. A core group of activists emerged in the small community of Mileston. Bernice Johnson, one of the first activists from the eastern part of the

\(^ {17} \) There were some rare cases in which NAACP leaders and liberal whites formed coalitions at the local level—this occurred, for example, in Coahoma County. However, these coalitions were stronger in state-level organizations like the Loyalist Democrats (Dittmer 1994; Simpson 1982).

\(^ {18} \) Governors could veto poverty programs unless they were administered through a college or university. Some programs, such as CDGM, were administered through historically black colleges to avoid the veto. Other programs were sponsored by universities outside the South, such as the Tufts Delta Health Center in Bolivar County.
county, remembers the diffusion process as follows:

Well, they were constantly trying to get new members. I remember when I first started going to Mileston, I encouraged the people in the community where I lived (which was Sunny Mount) to start having a meeting. . . . We were constantly going from community to community, from church to church, asking people to allow us to come into your church. . . . "Set up a community meeting. Elect you some officers—a president, a secretary, a treasurer or what have you—designate a certain time for your community meeting." (Rural Organizing and Cultural Center 1991, p. 70)

By 1964, most of the small communities in the county had held meetings sponsored by the MFDP that culminated in a monthly countywide meeting (Mississippi Department of Archives and History, MFDP Records, Reel 3, n.d.). Sue Lorenzi, a community organizer, reported weekly meetings in 15 different communities in 1966 (State Historical Society of Wisconsin [SHSW], Alvin Oderman Papers, August 27, 1966).

The movement infrastructure included multiple venues for leadership development. Salamon (1971:440), who conducted field research in Holmes County in 1969, estimated that there were approximately 800 formal leadership positions in movement organizations held by 600 different individuals.19

Financial resources were modest. However, they were derived from local activities including collections at monthly meetings, plate dinners, and set donations from churches of, for example, $100 a year. The FDP office was sustained by local collections—in 1966, "over $500 was raised . . . for its phone, rent, lights, some supplies" (SHSW, Alvin Oderman Papers, August 27, 1966). While the vast majority of resources were generated internally in the form of labor, the movement periodically employed outside help from sources like legal aid organizations or national civil rights organizations.

Ed Brown, one of the early SNCC workers in Holmes County, described the local movement

. . . as opposed to placing the emphasis on confrontational politics we had placed the emphasis on organizing so that in the instances where there were confrontations there was sufficient organizational strength behind it to make the whites think, you know, twice before doing anything. (Tougaloo College, Tom Dent Collection, July 2, 1979)

The Holmes County movement was a loosely coordinated federation of movements across the county that expanded the repertoire of skills at the local level and brought local activists into contact with state and national politics.

Initial efforts to form a CAP in Holmes County bypassed the strong movement infrastructure. In the fall of 1965, a committee appointed by the Board of Supervisors began plans to join Central Mississippi, Inc. (CMI), a multicounty CAP. OEO’s Southeast Regional Office was skeptical of CMI’s initial proposal. Bob Westgate, an OEO staff member, noted that

. . . although there are three Negroes on each of the [five], seven member county boards, I have my doubts of their real value to their people, whether they were really “elected” by their people, and suggest that they should be checked by someone from this office. At least eight of the 15 Negro members are dependent upon the white power structure for their jobs or welfare pension payments (five principals or teachers, two on welfare and one maid). (NA, RG 381, Box 5, December 11, 1965)

Westgate sought information through CORE and NAACP contacts, but neither organization could provide contacts because they did not have organizations in the counties. Originally, CMI had submitted a proposal reporting that 25 percent of the population was black, but OEO required an increase in the number of “minority representatives” when it discovered that the population in the six counties was actually 58 percent black (NA, RG 381, Box 5, December 11, 1965).

OEO was also concerned that “eight of the 20 white board members are ‘Johnson colonels’—men who contributed funds and support during Governor Johnson’s campaign” (NA, RG 381, Box 5, December 11, 1965). The governor exercised considerable power

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19 The 1960 census reports 19,488 black persons (71.9 percent of the total population) living in Holmes County (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1963).
over CAPs because he had to sign off on grants and the organization’s charter. With CMI, Johnson “allegedly held up the signing of the charter until these eight [supporters] were appointed on the board.” The president and vice president of the CMI board were Johnson loyalists, and they had strong ties to the local political structure. For example, Ringold, the president, was the attorney for the Board of Supervisors (the most powerful local political body in Mississippi) in Montgomery County (NA, RG 381, Box 5, December 11, 1965).

Because the formation of CMI occurred outside the public arena, it could not be contested by local activists. Daisy Lewis, director of the Holmes County Community Center, observed that “CAP came into Holmes County unexpectedly before the poor Negro and poor white had the chance to take part in it or decide if it would help our county or not…” (Tougaloo College, Ed King Papers, Box 11, 1966). A group of approximately 40 white leaders held a planning meeting in February 1966 to coordinate efforts. The Lexington Advertiser reported that “leaders were told that they have a choice of the county conducting its own anti-poverty program and ‘taking the Negroes along with us’ or not acting and have the Negroes and civil rights workers ‘take over’ (“Anti-Poverty Program Discussed,” February 24, 1966, p. 1). Despite being caught off guard, the movement quickly mobilized to participate in the program. On March 7, a public meeting was held with approximately 500 blacks and 30 whites in attendance (Lexington Advertiser, “Holmes CAP Advisory Group,” March 10, 1966, p. 1). Activists brought a series of demands including the dissolution of the existing board. A compromise was reached in which six additional members were elected to a temporary advisory committee. Other changes were made, including the election of a 31-member permanent advisory committee that would elect a six-member Board of Directors. In addition, each Head Start center would elect a separate advisory committee. Because the small communities throughout the county were already organized, the movement could elect a majority to the advisory committee and influence key policy decisions of the Community Action Program (Salamon 1971).

The Holmes County movement thus restructured the organization of poverty programs during the course of a single meeting. These policies ensured a high level of movement participation in future program implementation. By securing access to the administration of CAP, the civil rights movement was able to maintain control of Head Start centers through an independent, delegate agency. In addition, CAP initiated several projects that went beyond job training to address rural poverty in Holmes County. While the poverty programs provided services, they also provided jobs—the programs constituted the single largest employer in Holmes County (Salamon 1971).

**Bolivar County**

In the mid-1960s, the Bolivar County movement was weaker than that in Holmes County. Community organizers had begun campaigns in some towns (e.g., Shaw), but several communities had no movement activity. The movement was held together by a loose network of activists, but it did not have the regular meetings, diverse organizations, or comprehensive presence that Holmes County did. Nevertheless, civil rights activists mobilized a successful, widespread campaign to secure an independent, parallel program. This campaign became a major vehicle for building a movement infrastructure in Bolivar County.

As in Holmes County, the initial plans for a CAP occurred without movement participation. The Bolivar County Community Action Committee was formed in 1965 with key support from local elites including the Board of Supervisors and the Chamber of Commerce. As editor of the Bolivar-Commercial and President of the Chamber of Commerce, Cliff Langford provided considerable support for the program. From its beginning, local activists criticized the program for excluding movement participation and appointing conservative blacks to the CAP board. As was the case in many CDGM counties, mobilization crystallized in early 1966 when local leaders in Bolivar County learned that Head Start could no longer be administered through CDGM. Consistent with its new policy, OEO recommended that the Head Start program be shifted to the lo-
The Bolivar County CAP tried to respond to charges that its board was unrepresentative by holding open meetings at the local level to discuss program objectives and consolidate support. These meetings provided an opportunity for representatives of the CDGM-based group to publicly criticize the CAP board and build support for their challenge (SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, n.d.a; SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, March 13, 1966). These events culminated in a meeting between CAP and the CDGM group in March at which the Bolivar CAP voted down a proposal to transfer funds to the CDGM group and allow it to administer an independent program. This forced OEO to make a decision regarding the two groups (SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, 1966; SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, March 22, 1966).

OEO was initially opposed to having parallel organizations and favored a reorganization of the existing CAP board. Summarizing an extensive investigation, an OEO report emphasized that “it is crucially important that the Bolivar County Community Action Committee be given every consideration for funding” (NA, RG 381, Box 40, 1965). Despite initial support of the local CAP, Bill Seward concluded his investigation for OEO that

... although representing less than a third of the Negro population, [the CDGM group] is a potent and vocal force that must be recognized and included in any further OEO programs. ... [F]urther postponement [of funding] will raise the level of emotional discontent of the Negro/poor from one of frustration, channeled into constructive effort, to one of frustration resulting in overt demonstration. In other words, there had better be a Head Start and quick before the lid blows. (NA, RG 381, Box 40, March 17, 1966)

This analysis led Seward to recommend dividing the funds evenly between CDGM and the local CAP (NA, RG 381, Box 40, March 31, 1966; U.S. Senate 1967). In April, this was the compromise that OEO reached in Bolivar County—two separate Head Start

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20 Although there is no precise estimate of the movement’s size, the “Outline of Important Events’ cited above reports “approximately 7,000 signatures” on the petition (SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, n.d.b; for a copy of the petition see SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 2, n.d.c).
programs with separate staffs and administrations were funded (SHSW, Amzie Moore Papers, Box 3, April 14, 1966).

Despite initial opposition, support within OEO increased for the movement-based program which had applied for funding as the Associated Communities of Bolivar County (ACBC). A 1967 report noted that “preliminary evaluations indicate that the ACBC programs are probably better than the CA[P]’s.” Even though the Bolivar County CAP was making efforts to subsume ACBC within its program, OEO representatives in Mississippi stated that “our position will be to support and maintain ACBC as a separate entity” (NA, RG 381, Box 5, January 13, 1967). The Bolivar County movement leveraged a response from OEO because of its sustained mobilization using conventional and disruptive tactics. In the 1966 year-end report, the southeast regional director singled out Bolivar County because of the “lessening of over-all community tensions” (NA, RG 381, Box 2, December 30, 1966).

The Bolivar County movement was able to use sustained protest to secure an autonomous poverty program. Despite initial opposition, OEO officials came to see the duplication of administrative staff and costs as preferable to an ongoing challenge to their legitimacy in Bolivar County. The movement’s challenge depended on an expansive network of activists that could run Head Start centers, coordinate mass meetings, and negotiate the grant-writing process with OEO.

Movements in Holmes County and Bolivar County were successful at maintaining movement-controlled Head Start centers. In addition, both movements posed a credible threat that compelled local political elites to establish well-funded Community Action Programs. However, the counties differed in important respects. In Holmes County, activists achieved greater impact on the structure of CAP by capitalizing on a strong movement infrastructure. In Bolivar County, activists protected movement-affiliated Head Start programs but ceded control to the broader CAP program. This outcome resulted from the relatively greater opposition and the less developed infrastructure in Bolivar County compared with Holmes County.

CONCLUSION

A striking finding of this study is the extent to which movements shaped the implementation of local poverty programs. While this influence was certainly less than local activists would have desired, it was nonetheless considerable. The quantitative analysis shows that local movements had a positive impact on the amount of CAP funding in Mississippi counties. The case studies support my interpretation of the quantitative evidence and show how movements influenced the formation of Community Action Programs by carving out areas of administrative control.

I propose that researchers specify more precisely how movements shape social policy. Even in this small case study, I demonstrate several ways that local movements influenced policy implementation in Mississippi, including the disruption of program operations, negotiation with agency officials, and symbolic and persuasive protest activities. The greatest influence may have occurred indirectly when movements prompted local white politicians to actively pursue grants for poverty programs.

In terms of the movement-outcome models, the evidence indicates that the impacts of the movement were cumulative, rather than momentary as suggested by the action-reactation models. The movement posed a threat, but the threat was based on the ability of the movement to distribute federal programs independent of local agencies. Local movements used a variety of conventional tactics, but they did not abandon the politics of protest—marches and boycotts were organized in local communities throughout the late 1960s. Rather, movements were most influential when they built local organizations that allowed for an oscillation between mass-based tactics and routine negotiation with agency officials.

The action-reaction models cannot account for the sustained interactions between local movements and OEO officials during the implementation of poverty programs. During much of this period, local activists and program officials collaborated to establish poverty programs. The access-influence model would suggest a drift toward greater professionalization of the movement and the aban-
The movement infrastructure model shows how movements exert influence through multiple causal mechanisms. The three most crucial mechanisms observed in this study are (1) direct implementation of poverty programs, (2) indirect influence by challenging the political authority of local elites, and (3) disruptive and persuasive protest that compelled OEO to act on behalf of the movement. These forms of influence all derive from the organizational capacity of local movements. Direct program implementation required an extensive leadership cadre that could maintain ongoing ties to OEO officials, other programs throughout the state, and community members. In Bolivar County, activists secured independent programs over the initial opposition of OEO administrators and the local CAP. The movement-affiliated centers (formerly CDGM) continued to operate Head Start programs in 1966 without funding, illustrating the underlying strength of the local organization. The second form of influence flowed from the first. Because local movements were capable of operating poverty programs independently, they undermined the authority of local officials who had historically administered social programs. Finally, local movements used protest, including disruptive protest in Bolivar County, to bring additional pressure to bear on OEO and to mobilize national support. OEO officials came to see this as an inevitable part of the implementation process in Mississippi with civil rights groups acting as whistle-blowers.

As an analytic strategy, I have addressed the long-standing problems of studying movement outcomes, opening questions about the variation in movement infrastructures and the ability of movements to influence policy. The strategy employed is less generalizable than studies based on a representative sample of social movement organizations or campaigns (e.g., Gamson 1990), yet it avoids some of the problems inherent in studies analyzing multiple movements, such as limited measures of movement impact. While the Mississippi movement is exceptional in some respects, the movement employed organizational forms and strategies that are comparable to those of many other social movements, including labor movements (Fantasia 1989; Ganz 2000), the environmental justice movement (Bullard 1990), and many women's movements (Ferree and Martin 1995; Whittier 1995).

One might reasonably ask whether there were distinctive aspects of the War on Poverty in Mississippi that make this instance of policy implementation and the findings presented here unique? First, the high degree of public participation required by the poverty programs facilitated the movement's access to the programs while bringing the movement's opponents into the implementation process. Second, the high level of local autonomy permitted in the formation and management of projects allowed the movement to pursue local efforts to influence poverty programs rather than pursue a national struggle in which the movement would have had to target federal actors, especially Congress and the Presidency. Local variation in policy implementation is common for social policies in the United States (Amenta et al. 1994; Banaszak 1996; Clemens 1997), but the model might require modification to accommodate variation in political context (Amenta, Halfmann, and Young 1999). Third, the central role of racial politics in the development of the War on Poverty is seen, for example, in the ongoing efforts of OEO to showcase racial integration in its programs (Quadagno 1994). However, this conflict reveals dynamics of a more general nature in that the long-term goals of program administrators and movement activists often conflict. To address these concerns in a more meaningful way requires similar analyses of other social movements across a variety of policy arenas.

The growing body of research on movement outcomes calls for more explicit development of the causal arguments concerning movement impact. I provide a preliminary map of these arguments that allows for more systematic, comparative research: Future studies of outcomes can address these issues by (1) using quantitative analysis of outcomes across time and policy arenas, (2) giving greater attention to the process and mechanisms of impact through case studies, and (3) synthesizing across specific findings to explain variation across movements and political contexts.
Kenneth T. Andrews is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Harvard University. His current research examines questions about the impacts of social movements. He is completing a book, "Freedom is a Constant Struggle": The Dynamics and Consequences of the Mississippi Civil Rights Movement (Forthcoming, University of Chicago Press), that traces the development of the movement and its impact on electoral politics, educational institutions, and social policies. He is also beginning a project on contemporary environmental politics in the United States.

### Appendix Table A. Descriptions and Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black Mobilization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFDP membership, 1965</td>
<td>Number of MFDP staff/contact persons in county.</td>
<td>Tougaloo College, Ed King Papers, Box 11, August 23, 1965.</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAACP membership, 1963 (logged)</td>
<td>Number of members in NAACP 1963, (logged).</td>
<td>Library of Congress, NAACP Papers, Box 75, 1963.</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of black candidates, 1967</td>
<td>Black candidates running for office in 1967 county and state elections.</td>
<td>Mississippi Department of Archives and History, MFDP Records, Reel 2, n.d.; Tougaloo College, Rims Barber Papers, Box 1, August 4, 1967.</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Countermobilization</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent resistance during Freedom Summer</td>
<td>Number of incidents of physical attack on civil rights workers, June–August 1964.</td>
<td>McAdams (1988:257–82); Holt (1965:207–52); summary of incidents also included in SNCC and CORE papers.</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>County Socioeconomic Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of households (in 1,000s)</td>
<td>Number of households in county in 1960.</td>
<td>U.S. Bureau of the Census (1963).</td>
<td>5.64</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP grants 1965–1968 (in $100,000s)</td>
<td>Total CAP grants for 1965–1968.</td>
<td>NA, RG 381, Box 14, n.d. multiple files by organization name.</td>
<td>5.28</td>
<td>13.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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