THE IMPACTS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS ON THE POLITICAL PROCESS: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND BLACK ELECTORAL POLITICS IN MISSISSIPPI*

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In this paper, I examine the relationship between social movements and political outcomes. I begin by assessing the existing social movement literature and identifying key areas in which further theoretical development and additional empirical research will advance current knowledge. Building on the issues raised by this assessment, I examine the civil rights movement in Mississippi from the period of widespread mobilization in the early 1960s through the early 1980s. Specifically, I examine the impacts of local movements on four political outcomes: (1) number of Black voters registered, (2) votes cast for Black candidates in statewide elections, (3) the number of Black candidates running for office in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and (4) the number of Black elected officials. The strategies used by Whites to defeat or minimize the impact of the movement are critical pieces of the analysis. The evidence indicates that local movements have continued to play a central, though complex, role in the transformation of local politics long after the civil rights movement peaked. This suggests that, while mobilization plays a key role in the short run, its long-term consequences must be considered as well.

In their review of the social movements literature, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (1988) conclude that there is a “relatively underdeveloped state of knowledge about the dynamics of collective action past the emergence of a movement” (p. 728). This tendency to focus on the earliest and most visible phase of a social movement neglects the ongoing dynamics and long-term consequences of social movements. Tarrow (1994:170) refers to the “ambiguity of social movement outcomes” because the impacts of social movements are indirect and mediated by the political process. One reason for the limited body of research on social movements and their outcomes is the complex theoretical and methodological problems of mapping the causal links between a movement, other explanatory factors, and outcomes (for a review of the literature on outcomes, see Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995). In this paper, I address these problems and present an analysis of the long-term impacts of the civil rights movement on electoral politics in Mississippi.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL OUTCOMES

My aim here is to refine “political process theory” to better understand and analyze movement outcomes. This theory distinguishes between the internal dynamics of social movements and the political opportunity structure—the broad social, economic, and political dynamics that shape the opportunities and constraints for mobilization (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Morris and Herring 1987; Tarrow 1994). This dual focus has of-
ten been used to examine the origins of social movements or "protest cycles." Factors internal to social movements include leadership skills, organizational form and strength, informal networks of activists, and links among social movement organizations. The political opportunity structure includes the role of political allies and supporters, "availability of meaningful access points in the political system, the capacity and propensity of the state for repression, [and] elite fragmentation and conflict" (Brockett 1991: 254; also see McAdam 1996 for a comparison and synthesis of major approaches to the political opportunity structure). These internal and external factors affect the impact of social movements. The political process approach has great potential for the analysis of the consequences of social movements because of its dual focus on these internal dynamics of movements and the broader dynamics of political and economic institutions. Understanding of the dynamics of a social movement requires disentangling these internal and external factors.

Gamson’s *The Strategy of Social Protest* ([1975] 1990), an influential study of the success of U.S. social movements, draws on a sample of 53 “challenging groups” between 1800 and 1945. He assessed the ability of movement organizations to achieve “acceptance” (i.e., to be seen as representing legitimate interests) and to gain “new advantages” (i.e., achieving the particular goals sought by the group). Gamson found that many of the factors within a movement’s control, such as tactics, the use of violence, and organizational structure played a role in determining whether a movement achieved its goals.1

In a reanalysis of Gamson’s data, Goldstone (1980a, 1980b) argues that historical timing is the key factor predicting success of a social movement. During periods of crisis like the Great Depression, movements are more likely to achieve their goals. Simplifying it somewhat, the debate between Gamson and Goldstone concerns whether mobilization or the political environment is the key causal force. A recent examination of Gamson’s data shows that both environmental factors (e.g., periods of crisis) and organizational factors (e.g., factionalism) predict the success of protest groups (Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992). Gamson’s study frames the key questions for this study: *Do the mobilizing structures of social movements account for political outcomes? And if they do, how?*

Three points are critical for expanding and refining the analysis of social movements and outcomes. These are (1) temporality, (2) resistance strategies, and (3) the selection of outcomes.

**The Importance of Timing**

First, the time dimension is important in measuring mobilization and outcomes. Research on the relationship between social movement mobilization and political opportunity structures has generated greater attention to the question of timing within “protest cycles.” These issues are especially salient when studying movement outcomes in which the relations among variables change over time. Amenta, Caruthers, and Zylan’s (1992) recent research on the Townsend movement finds that, nationally, the impact of the movement on Congressional action mirrored shifts in the internal strength of the movement over the 1930s and 1940s. Yet in other cases the impact of movements may lag behind the peaks of mobilization, so that effects are seen only after the movement has declined. Conversely, a movement may initially generate gains that subsequently are eroded (Button 1978; Salamon 1979; Quadagno 1994). Analyses of the outcomes of a social movement must plot the shifting levels of mobilization against the varying impacts of the movement over a broad time span.

**Resistance Strategies**

A second issue in assessing movement outcomes is the role of resistance strategies. The sociological analysis of repression has made significant theoretical and empirical gains in recent years. However, the implications of repression for an analysis of movement outcomes remain largely unexplored. The key issue is sorting out the conditions under

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1 For elaborations and critiques of Gamson, see Steedly and Foley (1979), Goldstone (1980a; 1980b), and Mirowsky and Ross (1981). These articles are reprinted in an appendix to the second edition (1990) of Gamson’s study.
which repression diminishes protest and when repression “backfires,” generating higher levels of mobilization. Lichbach (1987) frames the alternatives as “deterrence or escalation?” In diverse movements scholars have found nonlinear relationships between repression and protest—for example, the Anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa (Olivier 1991), protest against the Shah’s policies in Iran (Rasler 1996), and anti-nuclear power movement in West Germany (Opp and Roehl 1990). Notably, all of these studies specify contexts in which repression has positive effects. Rasler (1996), analyzing the Iranian Revolution, demonstrates how repression both deters and escalates protest. She argues that “in the long run repression helped launch micromobilization processes that rapidly brought large numbers of people into the streets” (Rasler 1996:143). Within the face-to-face interactions of movement networks, the legitimacy of the state and its use of repressive tactics was undermined. The short-term effect of repression (lagged one-week) was a reduction of protest, yet the long-term effect of repression (lagged six-weeks) was an increase in the rate of protest (1996:140). In a study of mobilization among Latin American peasants, Brockett finds that whether repression “works” or fails to deter insurgency depends on timing, or what he calls “the temporal location in the protest cycle” (1993:474). The relationship is curvilinear, with repression being an effective deterrent prior to the emergence of a protest cycle and toward the end of a protest cycle. When mass protest is increasing, paradoxically repression can escalate protest. In sum, the key factors in the literature on repression that account for the positive impact of repression on protest are the micro-mobilization context and the temporal location in the protest cycle.

What is the impact of repression, direct or indirect, on outcomes? Here, the evidence is less developed. Gamson’s study (1990) is one of the few to take up this question, and he finds that the targets of violence are less likely to win “new advantages” or “acceptance.” This is another paradox involving the role of violence against social movements. Repression can, and often does, escalate protest, yet repression can also undermine the “success” of movements.

Resistance to a movement includes the tactics employed by individuals, small groups, and large organizations (such as governments and corporations) to undermine a movement and its goals. Case studies of the civil rights movement and the labor movement suggest that movement outcomes can be understood only through an analysis of the efforts to subvert, undermine, or co-opt the movement (Barkan 1984; Fantasia 1988; Parker 1990). Thus, in addition to examining the mobilization of Blacks, an assessment of the transformation of local and state politics requires a focus on counter-mobilization by Whites. These resistance strategies include: (1) nonviolent institutional strategies—the mobilization of organizational resources to defend the power and privileges of members of the polity; (2) violent strategies—the use of violence by the state or other actors targeting the movement and its supporters; and (3) micro-resistance—the use of intimidation in small-scale interactions, which often depends on the possession of greater institutional resources and/or implicit threats of violence.2

In a study of the Mississippi legislature’s response to the Voting Rights Act (VRA), Parker (1990) describes institutional strategies in the form of legal tactics that diluted the newly enfranchised Black electorate—what he calls the “massive resistance” legislation. As Parker argues, “Black people in Mississippi in 1967 were not writing on a clean slate. . . In large part, the white supremacy politics of the white majority have shaped post-1965 black politics” (1990:67). In the case of school desegregation, White resistance included the unique form of establishing private academies as counter-institutions.

Resistance can take public and institutional forms, like the massive resistance legislation and White-flight academies. Other forms of resistance include repression as the strategic use of violence by state officials and private groups.3 In Mississippi, repression peaked in

2 A fourth resistance strategy is the articulation of a counter-frame to delegitimize the movement or its goals.

3 The distinction between violence used by Mississippi state officials and private citizens is difficult to draw. The individuals directly responsible for the murders of James Chaney, Mickey
the mid-1960s with enormous levels of harassment, assault, bombings, and murder (Colby 1987).

Illustrating micro-resistance, Loewen (1981) describes the intimidation that can be exercised at polling places:

A 55 year-old black woman with four years of education forty years ago hesitantly lines up at a voting machine... The poll watcher asks “May I help you, Ma’am” and pulls the lever. He is then inside the booth with the voter. Because the ballot is set up alphabetically by candidate’s last name, rather than by party, the voter has to recall twenty names for whom she wishes to vote. “Do you want to vote for Evers?” he asks. Surprised by his fairness, she agrees. The poll worker knows that Evers has no chance statewide; what matters are the local races. He then asks, “Do you want X for sheriff?” mentioning the white incumbent... The effectiveness of such intimidating “assistance” is confirmed by quantitative comparisons. (Pp. 36–37)

The case Loewen describes took place in 1971, six years after the passage of the Voting Rights Act (VRA). He shows that by “skimming” a small percentage of the Black vote in majority-Black voting districts, White poll watchers contributed to disappointing outcomes for Black candidates statewide (also see U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1968, 1975, 1981; Salamon 1972; Berry 1973). These processes of micro-resistance are critical for understanding the impacts of social movements, and although they are difficult to measure they should receive theoretical consideration. I analyze the changing impact of repression as well as the broader use of legal and quasi-legal resistance to the civil rights movement.

Selection of Movement Outcomes

A third issue is the choice of outcome(s) to study and how to measure them. The optimal strategy is to use multiple indicators at different points in time. In a methodological discussion of research on the impacts of riots, Snyder and Kelly (1979) observe:

This “single-outcome-as-goal” model also characterizes all quantitative studies of the consequences of protest or violence. In fact, movement organizations (as do all groups) routinely experience relative success or failure on various dimensions as a consequence of their everyday activities. (Pp. 218–19)

Button’s (1989) study of the civil rights movement in six Florida communities is instructive here. He selects a wide range of outcomes in the public and private sector which allows him to examine variation among towns and among outcomes. He argues that “at the local level the civil rights movement did not evoke a unilinear process of change” (Button 1989:211). This insight that movements are neither monolithic nor uniform in their distribution, strength, or impact opens up new areas for exploring the outcomes that movements generate. The failure to separate movement goals and outcomes becomes problematic when it does not allow for the unintended consequences of social movements (Paul, Mahler, and Schwartz 1997). Establishing whether a movement achieves its explicitly stated goals is important, but to understand the consequences of movements, the researcher must dig deeper because social movements often have multiple and changing goals as well as unintended consequences.

Many claims have been made about the impact of the civil rights movement on U.S. society and politics, making the legacy of the movement contested and ambiguous. Nearly unquestioned is the attribution to the move-

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4 Much of the research on the impact of the civil rights movement, especially its impact on electoral politics, supports Button’s claim (see Davidson and Grofman 1994). Also, research on the Townsend movement shows regional variations in mobilization and impact on old-age policies (Amenta et al. 1992), as does Katzenstein’s (1987) essay on women’s movements in the United States and Europe.
ment of major federal initiatives, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act, and the War on Poverty. Others have attributed changes in attitudes toward race and politics to the efforts of the civil rights movement. Further, the emergence of the student antiracism movement and the women's movement have been attributed to the networks and tactical repertoires of the southern civil rights movement (Evans 1980; McAdam 1988).

In this study, I shift the focus from the national arena to small communities in the South that experienced unprecedented levels of mobilization during the 1960s. As James (1988) notes, "[T]heories that focus on the national state cannot explain the enormous historical variation in the local implementation of national policies" (p. 191). I examine the impacts of local mobilization on subsequent political transformations. Each of the analytic points raised above is embedded in my research design.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN MISSISSIPPI

In the early phases of the civil rights movement (1954–1960), mobilization was concentrated in urban areas and in the states of the upper South. By 1960, one of the major effects of the civil rights movement in Mississippi was the mobilization of White reaction. By June of 1956, two years after the Brown decision, the Citizens' Council—an organization founded in Indianola, Mississippi and composed of middle-class and elite White Southerners—could boast local organizations in 65 of Mississippi's 82 counties (Citizens’ Councils of America 1956:6). While a small cadre of NAACP workers led by Medgar Evers had laid groundwork, most observers and the major civil rights organizations believed that further progress was needed elsewhere before serious efforts could be made to mobilize the Black community in Mississippi (see Dittmer 1985, 1994; McMillen 1989; Payne 1995).

Mississippi's peripheral status in the development of the civil rights movement changed when the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), led by Bob Moses, began developing projects in Mississippi in 1961 (Zinn 1965; Moses 1970). SNCC's goals included the development of a grassroots infrastructure that would sustain the movement over the long haul. Between 1961 and 1963, SNCC initiated projects in a handful of communities. SNCC field workers combined the broader goal of developing grassroots leadership with the more immediate goal of voter registration—a goal that often led to other goals, like literacy courses and the alleviation of poverty. In 1963, the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO), an umbrella organization of the major civil rights organizations working in Mississippi, organized Freedom Vote, a mock election to symbolically demonstrate the efforts of Black Mississippians to participate in electoral politics (Sinsheimer 1989). The Mississippi movement dramatically escalated the pace of mobilization in 1964 by recruiting college students, primarily White and middle-class, from across the country to work in community projects throughout the state (see, for example, Harris 1982; McAdam 1988; Mills 1992; Mills 1993).

Following Freedom Summer, COFO and the newly formed Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) led an effort to unseat the all-White Mississippi delegation to the Democratic Party's 1964 National Convention in Atlantic City. The Credentials Committee failed to support the civil rights challenge, and the COFO delegation refused to accept the compromise offered by the Democratic Party of two at-large seats for Aaron Henry and Ed King. The conflict over whether to accept the compromise crystallized a long-standing rift within the Mississippi movement between a moderate NAACP-led wing and a more radical MFDP- and SNCC-led wing of the movement (see Romaine 1970; McLemore 1971; Carson 1981).

The Voting Rights Act, passed in 1965, shifted the political context for voter registration work in Mississippi. While discriminatory practices in voter registration have been documented after 1965, registrars were severely restrained, as a cursory look at voter registration data show (see Table 1). Nowhere is this situation more apparent than in Mississippi. The major problem that faced the movement in the electoral arena after
1965 was not registering voters but electing Black candidates to office.5

Electiong Black candidates in Mississippi was much more complicated than it appeared (Parker 1990). An array of resistance mechanisms implemented after passage of the VRA has impeded officeholding by Blacks to the present day. These forms of resistance are generally referred to as “vote dilution tactics” and include redistricting, discriminatory qualifications for Black candidates, purging of voter registration records, and switching from elective offices to appointive offices (Davidson 1984). Legal resistance was effective in minimizing the gains of the Black movement at three levels: (1) by limiting the number of Black elected officials for the period during which the movement dismantled “vote dilution” mechanisms through the courts; (2) by transferring political power from local elected positions to other arenas such as the state legislature or appointive offices; and 3) through Black outmigration, exacerbated by increased mechanization of farming. The Black population declined as a proportion of the total while the dismantling of legal resistance took place, leaving the Black electorate in a relatively weaker position in 1980 compared to 1965, even though a higher proportion of Blacks was registered in 1980. In short, the “massive resistance” legislation effectively limited the political power of Blacks.

In addition to confronting these barriers, Blacks in Mississippi faced manipulation and intimidation at polling places. In the 1971 statewide elections, in the majority-Black town of Shelby voting machines administered by Whites perceived as hostile to the Black community cast votes 5-to-3 against Black candidates. A booth administered by a trusted White turned out a 3-to-1 margin in favor of Black candidates (Salamon 1972). If these strategies were not enough to diminish Black electoral strength, the time-tested tactics of violence and economic intimidation continued through the 1970s. The present study assesses the impact of these tactics and examines the consequences of the movement and of White resistance in post-1965 Mississippi electoral politics.

DATA AND METHODS

For this study, counties in Mississippi are the units of analysis (N = 81).6 The data are clustered in eight groups of variables: (1) the civil rights movement, (2) the countermovement, (3) voter registration, (4) federal participation in voter registration, (5) the number of Black candidates running for office, (6) Black voter turnout, (7) Black elected officials, and (8) demographic and social characteristics of the counties. The data were drawn from a range of sources, including archival collections, government documents, and other published documents. Appendix A describes the variables and their data sources.

Mississippi is well suited for a study of the consequences of the civil rights movement in the South. It is an important case for understanding the history of race in the United States. Also, the state shows significant variation on key variables, which permits careful generalization to the civil rights

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5 In addition to electoral issues, the movement shifted attention to other areas, especially poverty programs and public school desegregation and funding.

6 Hinds County (Jackson) is omitted from the analyses for two major reasons. As it includes the capital of Mississippi, the county population far exceeds that of other counties. Second, Jackson served as the statewide base for COFO; thus, measures of mobilization reflect resources devoted to local organizing and to the statewide coordination of organizing. I am only interested in local infrastructures that cannot in Hinds County be easily distinguished from the state-level infrastructure.
movement in other parts of the South. However, Mississippi’s “exceptionalism” should be noted. The coordination of a statewide movement in the early 1960s and the wide array of strategies pursued by the movement make the Mississippi case unique. In most other Southern states the movement worked on a city-by-city basis rather than coordinating and confronting racial inequality statewide as it did in Mississippi. In terms of the available data this is a clear advantage because it means that comparable evidence can be used to examine varying levels of mobilization across the state. Also, the strategies used to resist the civil rights movement in Mississippi were more intense and more varied than in other states.

ANALYSIS

Prior research by historians and political scientists on the Mississippi civil rights movement and the sociological literature on movement outcomes leads me to address several unresolved debates (Salamon and Van Evera 1973; Colby 1986; Stewart and Sheffield 1987).

(1) What was the role of the civil rights movements in shaping the level of Black political participation and Black officeholding after the Voting Rights Act? The goal of the early movement was to develop a local movement infrastructure that could pursue the interests of the local Black community. I assess the extent to which a movement infrastructure was generated and the extent to which that infrastructure generated later political participation.

(2) What were the effects of repression on mobilization and outcomes? I assess the conditions under which repression “works” and when it “backfires.” I focus on the effects of violence by Whites on outcomes. I also specify the impacts of resistance on different outcomes and at different points in time.

(3) What were the effects of federal intervention (through the presence of federal ex-

7 The Southern Christian Leadership Conference’s (SCLC) strategy reflected this pattern by focusing on particular cities, for example, Birmingham, Selma, and Chicago. SNCC’s work outside of Mississippi also focused on single towns rather than on entire states.

aminers) on Black political participation? I assess the relative importance of federal enforcement and local organizing for explaining increases in Black political participation.

(4) What were the effects of underlying social structural factors on the level of mobilization and outcomes? For example, both the level of movement organizing and the level of electoral participation may be shaped by urbanization.

I use OLS regression and path analysis to examine the impacts of independent variables on Black political participation and Black officeholding. Throughout the analysis, I present standardized regression coefficients to compare the relative sizes of effects. First, I use the Freedom Vote of 1964 as a dependent variable to estimate the relative short-term impacts of mobilization and countermobilization. What are the characteristics of the counties in which COFO was most successful in mobilizing the Black community to participate in electoral protest? I then turn to four other groups of outcomes: (1) voter registration, (2) voter turnout, and (3) Black candidates running for office and (4) the election of Black officials.

The Contours of Mobilization before 1965

In the early period of mobilization (1961–1965), was the movement active in particular parts of the state, and if so, what were the characteristics of those areas? SNCC’s early work focused on the larger cities like Jackson and Hattiesburg and on counties in the “Black Belt”—the region of the South composed of counties with relatively large Black populations and single-crop agricultural bases. The Black Belt counties in Mississippi are in the Delta, the northwestern region of the state, plus several counties in the southwestern part of the state.

Was there systematic variation in the ability of the movement to mobilize the local community (measured by Freedom Votes cast in 1964)? The Freedom Vote, a mock election organized within the Black community, assesses the effectiveness of the movement on its own terms.8

8 The 1964 Freedom Vote was the second “mock” election. The 1963 Freedom Vote was for the offices of governor and lieutenant governor.
Table 2, which uses the number of Freedom Votes cast as the dependent variable, shows a significant positive effect of mobilization (the number of Freedom Summer volunteers and staff) and a significant positive effect of countermobilization (the number of physical attacks on civil rights workers during Freedom Summer).\textsuperscript{9} Not surprisingly, counties with more Freedom Summer volunteers turned out higher numbers of Freedom Votes. More interesting is the relationship between resistance to Freedom Summer and Freedom Votes: The model was run with three different indicators of counter-resistance (harassment, attacks, and arrests), and each had a positive and statistically significant effect.

So, rather than diminishing the efforts of civil rights activists, resistance escalated the confrontation and broadened the level of mobilization in the early 1960s. While this analysis shows that violent resistance can have the unintended effect of escalating mobilization within a relatively short timeframe, these results should be interpreted carefully. The period from June 1964, when Freedom Summer began, to November 1964, when Freedom ballots were cast, was an exceptional period—it combined high levels of national media attention with the most extensive mass mobilization for civil rights in the history of Mississippi. Payne’s (1995) study provides insight into how this escalation of Black mobilization and White violence interacted at the local level.

[In the spring of 1963, those whites desperately opposed to the movement were slow to understand that the calculus of repression had changed. They had now entered a situation in which a significant number of Greenwood

Table 2. Coefficients from OLS Regression of the Number of Freedom Votes Cast in 1964 on Selected Independent Variables: 81 Mississippi Counties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>(S.E.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Freedom Summer volunteers</td>
<td>.205*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[17.331]</td>
<td>(8.419)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance to Freedom Summer (physical attacks/assaults)</td>
<td>.434***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[283.515]</td>
<td>(53.751)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Blacks registered to vote, 1960</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.118]</td>
<td>(.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black voting-age population, 1960</td>
<td>.229*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[.061]</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent urban, 1960</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[5.628]</td>
<td>(3.710)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>—</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−34.648]</td>
<td>(111.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R\textsuperscript{2}</td>
<td>.759</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R\textsuperscript{2}</td>
<td>.743</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Unstandardized coefficients are in brackets; standard errors are in parentheses.

\textsuperscript{9} Because countermobilization measures were limited to counties where COFO operated projects, I also ran the regression analysis on two different samples: counties with Freedom Summer projects (N = 29); and counties in which Freedom Votes were cast (N = 56). Although the magnitude of the effects shifted slightly, the relative effects were unchanged.

Blacks, no longer feeling so alone and in some cases no longer fearing that there was much that could be done to them anyway, reacted to each additional act of intimidation by becoming more aggressive themselves. (Pp. 201–202)

The finding here generally supports other analyses of the effects of repression in terms of the positive effects of repression on protest (Opp and Roehl 1990; Brockett 1993; Rasler 1996). Payne’s analysis of the Greenwood movement also supports the argument that the micromobilization context includes intervening processes that explain the effects of repression and the subsequent escalation of protest. Finally, as Brockett (1993) predicts, violence visited upon the movement during Freedom Summer, a high point of mobilization, only increased collective action in the fall. However, over a longer timeframe and without constant media attention, a different pattern emerges.

\textbf{Voter Registration}

Voter registration soared following the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The impact of the legislation has often been debated, and the role of federal examiners,
Table 3. Coefficients from OLS Regression of Three Measures of Black Electoral Mobilization on Selected Independent Variables: 81 Mississippi Counties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Voter Registration 1967</th>
<th>Whitley 1966</th>
<th>Evers 1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coefficient (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coefficient (S.E.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Freedom Summer volunteers</td>
<td>.358***</td>
<td>.229*</td>
<td>-.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of NAACP members, 1966 (log)</td>
<td>.135*</td>
<td>.138*</td>
<td>.191***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[98.800] (55.678)</td>
<td>[45.595] (26.478)</td>
<td>[110.632] (28.734)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent resistance index, 1960–1969</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal examiners present</td>
<td>.119*</td>
<td>.246***</td>
<td>.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[437.704] (257.553)</td>
<td>[408.363] (122.479)</td>
<td>[158.858] (132.915)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black voting-age population, 1970</td>
<td>.400***</td>
<td>.423***</td>
<td>.796***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[.190] (0.55)</td>
<td>[.091] (0.26)</td>
<td>[.301] (0.28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent urban, 1970</td>
<td>-.066</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[-5.278] (6.960)</td>
<td>[-1.785] (3.310)</td>
<td>[1.228] (3.592)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>____</td>
<td>____</td>
<td>____</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[500.937]</td>
<td>[61.768] (110.819)</td>
<td>[149.620] (120.262)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.683</td>
<td>.649</td>
<td>.867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.657</td>
<td>.621</td>
<td>.856</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Unstandardized coefficients are in brackets; standard errors are in parentheses.

* Although the index covers the period 1960–1969, only 2 incidents out of 657 occurred after 1966.

*p < .05  **p < .01  ***p < .001  (one-tailed tests)

sometimes referred to as federal registrars, has attracted particular attention. Colby (1986) finds a positive impact of federal intervention on Black voter registration rates. Jones (1976) emphasizes the limited enforcement efforts of the Justice Department and notes that Mississippi was the only state to receive "significant federal examining activity" (p. 385). Despite a brief influx of examiners between 1965 and 1967, only two examiners were sent to Mississippi between 1967 and 1976 (Jones 1976: 385). Political scientists have held opposing points of view on the short-term and long-term significance of federal examiners for Black political participation.

Federal examiners usually were sent to counties known for discrimination against Black voters, and often were sent to counties that had experienced movement activity, or had previously been investigated by Justice Department officials. Counties in the Deep South were the target of the vast majority of federal examiners, with Mississippi receiving examiners in 31 counties by 1967 (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1965, 1968: 244–47).

Table 3 examines the impact of federal examiners, mobilization, and resistance on increases in the registration of Black voters. A new measure of mobilization, 1966 membership in the NAACP, measures the strength of the local movement after the passage of the VRA. Voter registration is measured as the total number of Blacks registered to vote in 1967. The size of the Black voting-age population is included as a control variable.

The Voter Education Project research in the 1960s showed that federal registrars had the largest impact on Black registration rates, followed by civil rights movement organizations (cited in Black and Black 1987:135). Table 3 shows a greater effect for local organizing.

10 The NAACP variable is logged because it is highly skewed with a small number of outliers. For example, Claiborne County has 1,316 NAACP members, whereas the mean for the state is 89.7. The unlogged variable, however, gives substantially similar results.
than for examiners.\textsuperscript{11} Most significantly, I find that the number of Freedom Summer organizers and NAACP membership are better predictors of Black voter registration (using the standardized coefficient as the criterion) than is the presence of federal registrars—Freedom Summer volunteers is by far the more powerful predictor. These findings suggest that the resources (Freedom Summer staff and volunteers) and results (NAACP membership) of the early period of organizing were primary factors in shaping higher levels of voter mobilization after the VRA.

In the next three sections I examine other forms of Black political participation that have received less attention. Voter registration is an intermediate outcome because it does not indicate particular gains made by the Black community—it only indicates the activation of that community toward achieving other goals.\textsuperscript{12}

\section*{Electoral Mobilization: Black Candidates for Statewide Office}

As indicators of electoral mobilization, I use votes cast for two Black candidates in their campaigns for statewide office—Clifton Whitley in 1966 and Charles Evers in 1971.\textsuperscript{13}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{11} I measure the presence of federal examiners in the counties. Federal examiners provided a parallel registration process that was intended to eliminate discrimination. Researchers have used the total number of Blacks registered by federal examiners as an indicator of the effectiveness of examiners. This conflates the outcome (number of registered Blacks) with the facilitative role played by examiners and overestimates the effect of examiners.

\textsuperscript{12} Another reason for examining other outcome measures is that the number of voters registered can be an unreliable measure of political participation. Voter registration records are not kept by race, so the data used are estimates made by local registrars or self-reported in Census data. Even aggregate data on voter registration tend to be inaccurate because registrars fail to purge records on a regular basis for deaths, migration, and felony convictions (Lichtman and Issacharoff 1991).

\textsuperscript{13} Clifton Whitley ran for the Senate against James Eastland in the Democratic primary in August 1966, and in the general election as an independent candidate. Voter turnout in these two elections is highly correlated ($r = .80$), so I use Extensive research has documented the persistence of “racial bloc voting” or “racially polarized voting” throughout the South and in major cities (Loewen 1990).\textsuperscript{14} Here, I assume that only Blacks voted for Whitley and Evers. Undoubtedly, some Blacks voted for White candidates. For example, some White poll watchers or employers manipulated Blacks to vote for White candidates, but systematic data on such manipulation of the Black vote is not available by county (Salamon 1972; Berry 1973; Loewen 1981). Moreover, the number of votes cast for Black candidates is a useful indicator of Black electoral strength because it suggests the degree to which the votes of Black citizens can be effectively marshaled in support of state-level Black candidates.

Like voter registration, voter turnout for these statewide elections is examined in terms of the impact of the civil rights movement, the presence of federal registrars, and other variables (see Table 3). The pattern of coefficients for the Whitley campaign resembles those found for voter registration in 1967. The civil rights movement (number of Freedom Summer volunteers and NAACP membership) and federal examiners have significant positive effects on the number of votes cast for Whitley. In fact, the presence of examiners has a slightly greater effect than the number of Freedom Summer volunteers. The effects of Freedom Summer volunteers and federal examiners are not statistically significant in the Evers campaign of 1971.

The Evers campaign for governor in 1971 differs from the Whitley campaign in that the movement base that was present in the early 1960s (Freedom Summer volunteers) does not play a significant role. However, NAACP membership, which measures mid to late 1960s strength of the movement, has a significant positive effect. Black political mobilization in Mississippi did not follow a linear path through the late 1960s and 1970s, underscoring the need for multiple

\footnotesize an average of the two as an indicator of Black electoral mobilization in the mid-1960s.

\textsuperscript{14} “Racial bloc voting” refers to the tendency for Whites to vote for White candidates and for Blacks to vote for Black candidates. In legal cases concerning discriminatory redistricting, research on racial bloc voting has established the discriminatory effect of at-large election systems.
measures of outcomes. As mayor of Fayette in Jefferson County, Evers’s political strength was concentrated in several majority-Black counties in southwest Mississippi (e.g., Claiborne, Wilkinson, Jefferson) that had experienced little civil rights activity from 1961 to 1965 (Berry 1973; Dittmer 1994). While the electoral successes of these counties have continued at the local level, these counties represent a different pattern of mobilization than that found in pre-1965 movement counties.

The Development of an Electoral Mobilization Infrastructure

The 1967 county and state elections in Mississippi were widely viewed as the first opportunity for Black Mississippian to build

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15 These three counties had no Freedom Summer volunteers or staff. By 1966, Claiborne County had 1,316 adult NAACP members; Jefferson County had 924, and Wilkinson County had 889.

---

on the massive gains in registered voters and make significant gains in officeholding. Over 100 Black candidates ran for office in 26 counties, with 22 candidates winning office in the November general election. While the victories were important, they were also disappointing, leading Parker (1990) to conclude that “... the 1967 election results were a substantial victory for Mississippi’s massive resistance to Black political participation” (p. 73). In which counties were Blacks most likely to launch campaigns for state and local office? The development of an electoral politics infrastructure—measured by the number of Black candidates in 1967 and 1971—is an intermediate outcome. In the next section I investigate the impact of this early infrastructure on the subsequent election of Black candidates to office.

Table 4 presents the results of a regression analysis predicting the number of Black candidates running for office in 1967 and 1971. The percentage of Blacks in the voting-age population replaces the size of the
voting-age population.\textsuperscript{16} A measure of Black voter turnout for Whitley in 1966 is included as an indicator of mass participation in electoral politics immediately after passage of the VRA.

The presence of federal examiners has no significant impact on the number of Blacks running for office. However, both the number of Freedom Summer volunteers and the number of NAACP members have significant positive effects, and violent resistance has a significant negative effect. The statistical nonsignificance of federal examiners is surprising from a political process perspective because the presence of examiners should indicate a greater “openness” of the polity. However, another dimension of the political opportunity structure is the use of repression by elites and other actors. Here the use of violence by local Whites decreases the number of Black candidates for office. In short, repression hampers the development of the infrastructure used to launch local campaigns.

The positive effects of Freedom Summer volunteers and the NAACP membership clearly indicate the transformation of a social movement infrastructure into an electoral mobilization infrastructure at the local level.

Black Elected Officials

The last set of regression models examines the election of Black candidates to office. Voter registration drives and voter turnout in statewide elections were mobilization tactics directed toward electing candidates who would better represent the interests of Black Mississippians. The best indicator of success in this arena is the election of Black candidates to office. These regression equations characterize those counties in which Blacks were able to elect officials. The 1967 and 1971 elections were held well before the major components of the “massive resistance” legislation were dismantled by the courts and by Justice Department intervention (Parker 1990). However, from the mid-1970s on, significant gains were made in electing Black candidates to office. My analysis therefore uses the number of county-level Black elected officials in 1974, 1979 and 1984 as dependent variables. Statewide, in 1974 there were 49 county-level Black elected officials statewide; the figures are 99 and 132 for 1979 and 1984, respectively.\textsuperscript{17}

Studies of Black politics in the South have found a consistent relationship between the percentage of the population that is Black and the number of Black elected officials. In electing Black candidates to office, the racial distribution of the population plays an overwhelming role. Parker (1990) suggests a “65-percent rule”: A population at least 65 percent Black is required to elect Black candidates consistently. “[A]ll of the black county supervisors who have won office have been elected from majority-black districts, most of them 65 percent black or more” (p. 159). A number of counties with strong organizational bases have faced structural blocks prohibiting them from translating those organizational bases into electoral representation, leaving blacks “in districts with a black population of less than 65 percent . . . dramatically underrepresented” (Parker, Colby, and Morrison 1994:144).

Table 5 presents the results from three separate regression equations predicting the number of county-level Black elected officials. Among the independent variables, I now include a measure of electoral mobilization in the late 1960s—the number of Black candidates running for office in 1967.\textsuperscript{18}

NAACP membership has a statistically significant and positive effect on the number of county-level Black elected officials in 1979

\textsuperscript{16} These two variables cannot be entered in the same equation without generating multicollinearity. In Tables 2 and 3, the dependent variables require a control for the absolute size of the Black electorate. In Tables 4 and 5, the dependent variables (Black candidates and Black officials) require a control for the relative size of the Black electorate.

\textsuperscript{17} Litigation postponed some of the 1983 county supervisor elections (Parker 1990:157). The results of those elections are not reported in the National Roster of Black Elected Officials for 1984, and they are excluded from this analysis.

\textsuperscript{18} To maintain consistency across the different models, I use the 1970 measures for percent urban and percentage of Blacks in the voting-age population in all of the remaining models, including the path analysis. Using 1980 measures of these variables produces nearly identical effects. For example, the correlation between the 1970 and 1980 Black voting-age population is greater than .98.
Table 5. Coefficients from OLS Regression of the Number of County-Level Black Elected Officials in 1974, 1979, and 1984 on Selected Independent Variables: 81 Mississippi Counties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1984</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coefficient (S.E.)</td>
<td>Coefficient (S.E.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Freedom Summer volunteers</td>
<td>-.065 [-.009] (.013)</td>
<td>-.174 [-.048] (.027)</td>
<td>-.109 [-.030] (.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of NAACP members, 1966 (log)</td>
<td>.126 [.090] (.056)</td>
<td>.188** [.263] (.117)</td>
<td>.217** [.299] (.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal examiners present</td>
<td>-.021 [-.078] (.287)</td>
<td>-.050 [-.348] (.596)</td>
<td>.057 [.393] (.605)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>[-1.195]*** (.367)</td>
<td>[-2.320]** (.763)</td>
<td>[-2.573]** (.776)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| R²                                           | .701       | .654       | .633       |
| Adjusted R²                                   | .667       | .615       | .592       |

Note: Unstandardized coefficients are in brackets; standard errors are in parentheses.

* p < .05    ** p < .01    *** p < .001 (one-tailed tests)

and 1984, while percent voting for Whitley in 1966 has a positive effect in 1974 and 1979. The relative size of the Black voting-age population has a significant positive effect on the number of Black elected officials in all three models. The index of White violent resistance has a significant and negative impact on the number of county-level Black elected officials for all three years. Percent urban and the presence of federal examiners have no significant impacts on the number of Black elected officials for any of these years.

The negative though nonsignificant coefficient for Freedom Summer results from the disproportionate impact of the southwest “Evers” counties (especially Jefferson and Claiborne Counties). These counties can be treated as outliers because of the large residuals for each county. These are the only two counties in which the majority of county-level offices are held by Blacks in 1984 even though they had no Freedom Summer projects. A reanalysis of the three equations excluding Jefferson and Claiborne Counties provided similar results: The number of Freedom Summer volunteers has a positive, but still nonsignificant coefficient. These counties are retained in all models because empirical analyses omitting these counties generate the same substantive conclusions. However, the discussion here confirms that there was no single linear path leading to the election of Black candidates.

The analyses presented in Tables 5 suggest that violent resistance by Whites discouraged the election of Blacks to office. This relationship contrasts with the positive impact of violent resistance on the number of Freedom Votes cast in 1964. Over a long time-frame, violent resistance diminishes the acquisition of political power by Blacks. Here, the importance of including a time dimension and the use of multiple outcome measures is confirmed.
Refining the Links between Movements and Outcomes

This final segment of the analysis builds on the prior linear regression equations to present a path analysis of the final dependent variable—the number of Black elected officials in 1984. Previous models referred only to direct effects; path analysis allows for a consideration of direct and indirect effects, thus providing a better model of the underlying causal processes. In addition, the path diagram summarizes key points that emerged in the earlier models such as the transformation of the movement infrastructure to an electoral mobilization infrastructure in the 1967 elections, and the role played by repression in diminishing the acquisition of political power.

Figure 1 presents the results of the path analysis.\(^{19}\) The path model includes the number of Black candidates for office in 1967 as an indicator of the electoral base in a county after passage of the VRA. Numbers on paths are standardized coefficients. The strongest direct effect on the number of Black elected officials is the relative size of the Black voting-age population, followed closely by the number of Black candidates for office in 1967. NAACP membership has a direct positive effect, while the violent resistance index has a direct negative effect on the number of county-level Black elected officials. Indirect effects mediated by the number of Black candidates in 1967 (in order of strength determined by the path coefficients) are the percentage of Blacks in the voting-age population, Freedom Summer volunteers, NAACP membership, and violent resistance. Indirect effects through NAACP membership are Freedom Summer and percentage of Blacks in the voting-age population. Violent resistance is impacted positively by Freedom Summer volunteers and percent urban.\(^{20}\) Finally, the number of Freedom Summer volunteers is positively affected by both exogenous variables (percent urban and the percentage of Blacks in the voting-age population).

The path analysis demonstrates that the number of Black candidates in 1967 is a key intervening variable transmitting the effects of the movement base created in the pre- and post-VRA period (Freedom Summer volunteers in 1964 and NAACP membership in 1966) to later Black electoral success. The model specifies the transformation of the early movement base, which produces an infrastructure prepared to take advantage of new opportunities that emerge in the 1970s and 1980s. The effect of the number of Freedom Summer volunteers is mediated by NAACP membership and the number of Black candidates, while NAACP membership has a direct and an indirect effect through the number of Black candidates. This suggests that one of the ways that social movements generate social change is by producing local organizations and networks. I call this cluster of organizations and networks the electoral mobilization infrastructure.\(^{21}\) In Mississippi, the civil rights movement generated an independent structure by the late 1960s that was positioned to take advantage of opportunities opening up in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition, repression has negative direct and indirect effects on the number of Black elected officials. Once again, the number of Black candidates in 1967 mediates the relationship between violent resistance by Whites and the number of Black elected officials. Thus, one of the ways

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\(^{19}\) The path coefficients were determined by a reanalysis using only statistically significant variables. As in Table 5, the number of Black candidates in 1967 is used in the path analysis to emphasize this early point in the development of the electoral infrastructure. I treat the number of Freedom Summer volunteers as an independent variable in relation to the violent resistance index even though some of the violence occurred before Freedom Summer. This decision is based on the observation that violence often occurred in response to movement activity. Colby (1987) makes a similar decision, treating an index of civil rights activity as an independent variable predicting violence by Whites (1987).

\(^{20}\) The percentage of Blacks in the voting-age population does not have a direct effect on the violent resistance index—the relationship is curvilinear.

\(^{21}\) The electoral mobilization infrastructure resembles the idea of "abeyance structures" advanced by Taylor (1989) to refer to the organizations that link two periods of mass mobilization (1989). However, electoral infrastructures link widespread mobilization to later success in electoral politics.
Figure 1. Path Model Predicting the Number of County-Level Black Elected Officials in 1984: 81 Mississippi Counties

Note: Numbers on paths are standardized coefficients. Only statistically significant effects are shown (p < .05, one-tailed tests).
repression "works" is by reducing the number of Black candidates for office.

DISCUSSION

The findings on Black elected officials should be placed within the context of Mississippi politics. Mississippi has experienced dramatic increases in Black officeholding. Yet, in Mississippi, where Blacks constituted approximately 32 percent of the voting-age population in 1980, Blacks held roughly 10 percent of all elected offices as late as 1984. In addition to this rough measure of the misdistribution of political power, observers have noted that Black officeholding was concentrated in lower-level positions and in small towns and rural counties with limited economic resources (Davis 1987). Any conclusions drawn from this research should be placed within this broader context.

Two related questions this research raises but cannot directly address are: (1) Is political access in the form of elected officials followed by demobilization, and (2) what effects do Black elected officials have on the distribution of public goods? Both of these questions cry out for careful research.

The analysis presented here confirms many of the predictions in the social movement literature about the effects of repression on protest and collective action. In certain circumstances, repression escalates protest. But, confirming Gamson's (1990) conclusion, violence often has a large negative impact on the long-term ability of a movement to achieve its goals. Massive resistance legislation was effective to the extent that it prevented the election of a Black candidate to the House of Representatives for more than 20 years; it also prevented the election of candidates to many lower-level offices. Like legal resistance, violent resistance has limited Black officeholding at the local level, suggesting a permeable boundary between "normal" politics and violence. These effects have persisted long after violent resistance collapsed as a strategy.

How can we account for the different effects that violent resistance has had on social movements and their impacts? Some of the most compelling images from the civil rights movement show Black youth in Birmingham being attacked by White firemen, and non-violent protesters in Selma being brutalized by state troopers on horseback at the Pettus bridge. In both of these cases, a persuasive argument can be made that violent resistance backfired—or in Charles Payne's words the "calculus of repression" changed (1995:202). Can we draw the conclusion from these cases, or from the present analysis of the 1964 Freedom Vote, that repression does not work? It appears that when a movement is at its strongest (and media attention is highest), violent resistance can be used by a movement to broaden mobilization. Over a longer time-frame, however, violent resistance severely limits the acquisition of political power by Blacks—at least it did in Mississippi, where resistance reduced the number of Black candidates running for and being elected to office.

The findings concerning violent resistance are particularly intriguing. However, we should not overlook the impact of the civil rights movement itself on electoral outcomes. Civil rights mobilization changed electoral outcomes 10 to 20 years after the peak of the movement. This is a theoretically and historically important result. While movements rarely achieve all of their goals, they can generate enduring consequences. As Tarrow (1994) notes:

[Protest cycles do not simply end and leave nothing but lassitude or repression in their wake; they have indirect and long-term effects that emerge when the initial excitement is over and disillusionment passes. Especially when movements transform their initial challenges into permanent access to power and leave lasting networks of activists behind, they can reappear after the cycle is over and new opportunities appear. (P. 172)]

This claim is often asserted as a matter of fact, but the relationship is rarely documented or clarified through actual analysis. The results reported here demonstrate that an important determinant of a movement's ability to shape electoral outcomes is its success in generating a local infrastructure.

Ella Baker, a life-long activist who guided SNCC in its early development, distinguished between mobilizing and organizing.

Organizing... involves creating ongoing groups that are mass-based in the sense that the people a group purports to represent have real impact on the group's direction. Mobilizing is
more sporadic, involving large numbers of people for relatively short periods of time and probably for relatively dramatic activities. (Payne 1989:897)

This organizing approach characterized the civil rights movement in Mississippi. Mobilizing techniques like the Freedom Vote were used, but they were embedded in the larger framework of community organizing. The casting of ballots in the Freedom Vote followed long periods of citizenship and literacy classes, mass meetings, and registration canvassing.

Mobilizing tactics such as those used in the campaigns in Birmingham or Selma played an important role in securing federal initiatives like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Garrow 1978; Burstein 1985; Morris 1993). How-

22 Morris’s (1993) research demonstrates the importance of organizing for the success of large, ever, the dramatic conflicts that these mobilizations created have obscured the less dramatic role of organizing and its long-term effect on political outcomes in the history of the civil rights movement and in the sociology of social movements.

Kenneth T. Andrews is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Harvard University. He recently completed his Ph.D. dissertation (at SUNY-Stony Brook) on social movement outcomes and the Mississippi Civil Rights Movement. It examines a broader data set than the current study, and investigates electoral politics, educational institutions, and poverty programs. It also includes three community studies. His research interests include social movements, political sociology, race and ethnicity, and the sociology of law.

Forman (1972) argues that SCLC’s campaign in Selma (and Albany) depended on the organizing of SNCC field workers in Selma and nearby Lowndes County.

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**Appendix A. Descriptions and Data Sources for Variables Used in Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Freedom Summer volunteers</td>
<td>Number of Freedom Summer volunteers and staff working in county, summer 1964.</td>
<td>SNCC papers, Schomburg Center for the Study of Black Culture, New York, NY, A: XV:197, Reel 39.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Black candidates, 1967</td>
<td>Number of Blacks running for office in 1967 in county and state elections.</td>
<td>Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party micro-film collection, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, Reel 2; Rims Barber Papers, Tougaloo College, Tougaloo, MS, Box 1, File 7; also see Baer (1970).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Black candidates, 1971</td>
<td>Number of Blacks running for office in 1971 in county and state elections.</td>
<td>Rims Barber Papers, Tougaloo College, Tougaloo, MS, Box 1, File 7.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Appendix A continued on next page)
THE IMPACTS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

(Appendix A continued from previous page)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Variable Description</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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———. 1989. Dark Journey: Black Mississippi-


Mississippi Research and Development Center. 1983. *Handbook of Selected Data for Mississippi.* Jackson, MS: Mississippi Research and Development Center.


