

Protest Campaigns and Movement Success: Desegregating the South, 1960-61¹

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Abstract

Does protest matter? Although scholarship on the consequences of social movements has grown dramatically, most recent studies examine whether stronger movement organization increases the chance of success. Where protest is analyzed, most studies find no positive effect of disruptive protest. We examine a classic case of disruptive protest – the 1960 lunch counter sit-ins by black college students. Using an original dataset of 334 cities in the South, we analyze the occurrence of desegregation following the sit-ins. We test whether protest, after controlling for many characteristics that predict the occurrence of protest, increases the likelihood of desegregation. We also test whether the presence of strong movement organizations, favorable political contexts, and economic opportunities increase the likelihood of successful outcomes. We find that sit-in protest increased the likelihood of desegregation, and that protest in nearby cities also had a positive impact. This indirect effect reveals the diffusion of success: sit-ins in a nearby city made desegregation there more likely, which in turn facilitated desegregation in this city. We find partial support for movement infrastructure, political mediation, and economic opportunity arguments.

After many decades of sustained focus on the origins of social movements, scholars have recently begun serious investigation into their consequences. Amenta and colleagues (2010) provide one key indicator of this growth by identifying thirty-eight articles on the political consequences of movements published in the top four sociology journals between 2003 and 2009.² We advance this growing body of scholarship by examining the success of protest campaigns to desegregate public accommodations during the Southern civil rights movement.

Despite the growth of research on movement consequences, most scholars focus on whether greater organizational resources increase movement influence. Among the studies that do examine whether protest matters, many indicate that protest has no effect. For example, McAdam and Su find that anti-war protest “depressed the overall rate of House and Senate voting” related to the Vietnam War (2002, p. 718). Studying the link between environmental protest and policymaking, Olzak and Soule argue that “institutional tactics rather than disruptive ones...assist movements in gaining an audience in Congress” (2009, p. 219, see also Giugni 2007). Thus, our understanding of protest influence is uncertain at best.

We assess the influence of protest while controlling for the factors that explain protest itself. Building on recent work, we argue that protest may have direct influence by imposing costs on targets and indirect influence by shifting bystanders support for the target (King 2008; 2011). Alternative explanations must be considered as well, and we test whether stronger movement infrastructure, supportive political environments, and favorable economic conditions account for the apparent influence of protest. Unlike most prior studies, we consider whether protest in

² Uba (2009) reviewed seventy-four articles on movement consequences in eleven sociology and political science journals published between 1990 and 2007.

neighboring cities influences the likelihood of success because success itself may diffuse as elites adapt to new new norms and preempt further protest. The central contribution of our paper is that we provide a strong test of protest efficacy alongside three alternative theories. Moreover, we shed new light on a central case in the study of social movements.

Sit-in Campaigns and Desegregation

The desegregation of public accommodations is a historically significant and, surprisingly, understudied aspect of the black civil rights struggle. Although scholars have documented the gains and setbacks in electoral politics, school desegregation and social welfare provisions, there has been much less attention to the desegregation of restaurants, movie theaters, hotels, libraries, hospitals, beaches and other public settings (Andrews 2004; Button 1989; Santoro 2002). This is surprising because most of the mass protest occurred around campaigns to desegregate public accommodations (Wright 2008).

The civil rights struggle – often characterized as a “movement of movements” - encompassed numerous campaigns, organizations, and leaders pursuing a wide range of goals and targets (Isaac 2008). However, it was the challenges to segregated public spaces that became the center of mass participation in the movement in the 1950s and early 1960s. Consider the iconic events and campaigns of the Southern movement such as the Montgomery Bus Boycott (1955-1956), the Sit-ins (1960), the Freedom Rides (1961), the Albany Campaign (1962), and the Birmingham Campaign (1963). These events were all coordinated assaults on segregation in public settings. Data on civil rights movement activity reported in the *New York Times* show the centrality of

desegregation in the early 1960s.³ The desegregation of neighborhoods, schools, public or commercial facilities was “the primary claim or demand made by protesters” at 75% of the events in 1960 and 83% in 1961.⁴ In 1963 alone there were at least 930 demonstrations in more than 115 cities with thousands of arrests (Morris 1993). Although scholars have focused on interaction with political authorities, businesses were a target of collective action for roughly half of the civil rights events occurring in the South in 1960 and 1961. By contrast, school desegregation strategy relied on litigation, and voting barriers were challenged using community organizing and voter registration campaigns (Andrews 2004).

Campaigns to desegregate public accommodations have a long history dating back at least to turn-of-the-century challenges to segregation in street cars (Meier and Rudwick 1975). The sit-in tactic itself was developed in the 1940s and 1950s by CORE and NAACP activists and deployed primarily in Border States and in the North until 1960 (Meier and Rudwick 1975). Sit-ins involved the physical occupation of segregated public spaces thereby challenging and disrupting the normal operation of business. The tactic was employed most famously at lunch counters, but many other sites were targeted including restaurants, libraries, public beaches, churches, and bus stations.

³ Data from the Dynamics of Collective Action project, led by Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, Susan Olzak, and Sarah Soule (www.stanford.edu/group/collectiveaction/). The South is defined here as the fourteen states used in our analysis below.

⁴ This designation is based on whether one of the four possible claims coded by the Dynamics of Collective Action project included desegregation (category 1501).

The lunch counter sit-ins that swept through the South in the spring of 1960 constituted a major acceleration of the civil rights struggle and a key turning point. Earlier protest campaigns were typically isolated to one or a small number of cities, and most occurred outside of the core Southern states where segregation was fully institutionalized (Morris 1981). In the mid-1950s, the Montgomery bus boycott and its forerunners demonstrated the viability of organizing a mass movement to challenge segregation. However, there were few protest campaigns between 1956 and the beginning of the Greensboro sit-ins on February 1, 1960 (Andrews and Biggs 2006). This changed quickly as college students throughout the South became involved in direct action protest. Thus, the 1960 sit-ins are credited with revitalizing the Southern civil rights struggle and politicizing college students. Moreover, the sit-ins led to the formation of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) that played a critical role in shaping the civil rights movement (Carson 1981).

The initiating event occurred when four students at Greensboro's North Carolina A&T began their protest on February 1, 1960 (Chafe 1980; Wolff 1970). Following Greensboro, protest spread to nearby cities with large numbers of black college students. By mid-April sit-in campaigns had been launched in over 60 cities in every Southern state except Mississippi. Thousands of college students with little or no prior activist experience joined the sit-ins or related picket lines, demonstrations, and marches (Biggs 2006). Many more black Southerners participated by attending mass meetings, contributing to protest organizations, or supporting economic boycotts. Sit-in protest launched local campaigns that unfolded over many months leading to broad mobilization and protracted negotiations with white leaders. The sit-ins have been a central and influential case in movement studies. However, most prior scholarship has

concerned the origins and diffusion of protest (Andrews and Biggs 2006; Killian 1984; McAdam 1983; Morris 1981; Oberschall 1989; Polletta 1998). We return to this case to ask an equally important theoretical question concerning movement impact.

Historical accounts of desegregation focus on the 1964 Civil Rights Act as the key legislative victory ending segregation through the enforcement of Title II (Grofman 2000). However, this narrative is flawed on two counts. First, establishments were desegregated in many Southern cities prior to passage or implementation of the Civil Rights Act. The Nashville movement achieved one of the earliest victories in the desegregation of lunch counters on May 11, 1960 followed by other cities including Winston-Salem on May 25 and Greensboro on July 25 (Oppenheimer 1963; Wolff 1970). Other cities such as Memphis and Atlanta resisted desegregation despite ongoing protest and sporadic negotiation between white and black community leaders (Jones and Long 1965; Oppenheimer 1963). The Justice Department tracked desegregation of theaters, restaurants, hotels, and lunch counters in 560 cities through the early 1960s and found substantial increases in cities with at least one desegregated facility. Cities with desegregated restaurants, for example, rose from 25% in May 1963 to 53% by February 1964 (Oberschall 1973, p. 225).

Second, the idea that desegregation occurred with minimal conflict is undermined by the intense repression and counter-mobilization surrounding desegregation protest and the contestation around the public accommodations component of the civil rights bill (Whalen and Whalen 1985). Advocates working to build support for the Civil Rights Act were concerned, in fact, that provisions regarding segregation in public accommodations would undercut support for the bill

exactly because resistance was so fierce (Burstein 1993; Jeong, Miller, and Sened 2009; Whalen and Whalen 1985). Desegregation of public accommodations was more central and contentious than is normally assumed, and there is a strong theoretical and historical motivation for examining this case.

We focus on the successes and failures of local campaigns prior to passage of the Civil Rights Act. Examining local patterns of change is necessary for understanding the foundation on which larger national legislative victories occurred. In this way, the impact of civil rights movement followed a trajectory like other major social movements – including suffrage, old age assistance, and prohibition – in which local victories were ultimately consolidated in national legislation (Amenta 2006; McCammon, Campbell, Granberg, and Mowery 2001; Szymanski 2003).

Explaining Movement Success

Why did lunch counters in some cities desegregate while others resisted change? More generally, was protest the central factor driving desegregation? We argue that protest is likely to induce change by threatening established actors and by enlisting the support of bystanders. This view accords with a long tradition of social movement theory that conceptualizes protest as “politics by other means” (Piven and Cloward 1977; Schwartz 1976; Tilly 1978; Wilson 1961) and more recent theoretical accounts of protest influence (Andrews 2001; King and Pearce 2010; Luders 2006). Given how central this insight is to social movement theory, research supporting the claim is surprisingly sparse and less definitive than would be expected.

Does Protest Matter?

Movement scholars have long held that protest can secure gains by imposing costs on targets. In the case of the sit-ins, much like strikes, the primary logic is clear. By disrupting normal operations, protesters may damage a target's economic viability. This can occur by preventing the business to open or mobilizing boycotts. Protest may also have indirect influence by undermining the reputation of a particular company, a local business sector, or a larger industry (King and Pearce 2010). Beyond costs, protest campaigns may be more effective when they communicate a large base of support, high levels of commitment, or appeal to broader moral frameworks (Tilly 1998).

Although movement scholars typically assume that protest is a powerful tool for bringing about social change, causal claims must be assessed rigorously. One of the defining debates in the study of movement consequences concerns whether apparent movement effects are spurious (Giugni 1998). In *The Strategy of Social Protest*, Gamson (1990) studied 53 challenging groups, finding that success was more likely when the group employed disruptive tactics and had formal, bureaucratic organizations. In an influential exchange, Goldstone (1980) argued that these relationships were spurious and could be explained away by controlling for periods of openness to political reform. Thus, one of the enduring challenges is accounting for characteristics of the broader social and political context that may explain the emergence of movements and their apparent influence.

Movement scholars have made striking advances over the past fifteen years assessing the consequences of movements. Most recent research, however, focuses on characteristics of

movement organizations (e.g., organizational density, membership, funds) rather than protest (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Andrews 2001; McVeigh, Welch, and Bjarnason 2003; Soule and Olzak 2004). Two-thirds of the studies that Amenta et al (2010) reviewed focus on organizational determinants of movement influence without considering protest activity. Although we have a better understanding of how organizational characteristics shape outcomes, our understanding of protest influence is more limited.

When scholars do examine protest, significant methodological challenges hinder efforts to gauge the power of protest. For example, few analyses of protest influence simultaneously consider a movement's organizational characteristics (for exceptions, see Isaac, McDonald, and Lukasik 2006; Olzak and Soule 2009). The most typical design aggregates protest within a country into an annual time series to estimate outcomes, such as legislation, in the subsequent year (Agnone 2007; Giugni 2007; Olzak and Ryo 2007; Santoro 2002).

The alternative strategy disaggregates protest into individual events or campaigns, whose immediate outcomes are assessed. Strikes are a prime example, because it is clear whether workers gained concessions or not (e.g., Currie and Ferrie 2000; Geraghty and Wiseman 2008). Others have examined boycotts and other protest targeting corporations. For example, King and Soule (2007) find that protest demonstrations reduce stock price returns over a window of weeks. Our study follows in this tradition because it allows us to identify plausible mechanisms of protest influence.

However, we go beyond the typical strategy of examining whether protest and related characteristics of a specific unit (e.g., city, state, workplace) influence subsequent changes to the same unit. Protest campaigns emerge and spread through diffusion processes with strong spatial clustering (Soule 2004). Protest in one city may influence outcomes in that city and have indirect influence elsewhere. In a study of French coalminers, Cohn (1993) finds that failed strikes—under some circumstances—increased average wages in the same *département*. More recently, scholars have assessed the spatial structure of protest in a more systematic way. For example, Ingram, Yue, and Rao (2010) examine the siting of Wal-Mart stores between 1998 and 2005. They find that Wal-Mart is less likely to open a proposed store when protesters have successfully blocked a store opening in a nearby city. They also find that proposed stores in isolated areas are more likely to open despite protest because, there is little threat that protest will spread (see also Vasi and Strang 2009).

Elites and authorities learn from and are inspired by one another, just like protesters. Businesses may be reluctant to change if neighboring cities have not. This might help explain why lunch counters were desegregated in some cities—such as Orlando, FL and Fredericksburg, VA—with minimal protest and weak movement organizations, where protest occurred in neighboring cities. Conversely, lunch counters were not desegregated in other cities—such as Little Rock, AR and Tallahassee, FL—with strong organizations and considerable protest, but which were geographically isolated from other hubs of movement activity. In sum, we test whether protest increased the likelihood of desegregation and whether protest or success occurring nearby increased desegregation.

Movement Infrastructure

Some scholars emphasize the importance of pre-existing organizations as the key determinant of protest and outcomes. Proponents of movement infrastructure highlight the importance of leadership, organizational strength, and tactical diversity to the accomplishment of movement goals (Andrews 2004; Gamson 1990; Ganz 2000; Morris 1993; Olzak and Ryo 2007). Militant protest generates pressure but formal organizations and leaders must negotiate successfully. In the context of broader campaigns, organizational diversity allows for specialization where some organizations play a primary role in protest while others are more central to negotiation and bargaining (Lind and Stepan-Norris 2011; Staggenborg and Lecomte 2009).

Analyzing the Birmingham campaign, Morris critiques other scholars who ignore “the existence of a sustained civil rights movement in Birmingham since 1956...[which] enabled thousands of people to be mobilized rapidly” (1993, p. 624). Although Morris pays considerable attention to protest, he argues that “widespread mobilization is a function of the extent and distribution of a protest movement's internal social organization” (p. 634). Morris challenges what he calls the “violence thesis,” which contends that protesters must attract support from a third party to compensate for their limited power. It was not intervention by federal authorities but mass mobilization, he argued, that brought the city’s elites to the bargaining table.

Historical accounts of desegregation indicate that protracted negotiations preceded success (Oppenheimer 1966). Established leaders of the NAACP and civic and ministerial associations were central to this negotiation process while student and militant adult leaders were not directly involved in most cities (Chafe 1980; Jones and Long 1965). This contrasts with the onset of

protest where established leaders played a marginal role (Andrews and Biggs 2006). From this perspective, we would expect protest in cities with militant organizations and successful outcomes in cities with formal, adult-led organizations. This perspective also highlights the role of counter-movements because the opposition's movement infrastructure is crucial and should reduce the likelihood of success (Andrews 2004; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996).

Political Mediation/Opportunity

Political mediation/opportunity theory provides the most developed alternative to arguments about the impact of movements – whether protest or organization. The political conditions that facilitate movement emergence may account for their apparent influence (Kitschelt 1986).

Political opportunity theorists argue that elite allies, political access, and weak or minimal opposition is necessary for movement success (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1998). Amenta, Caren and Olasky (2005) advance a political mediation argument that has gained considerable empirical support. The central claim is that movement influence is indirect and requires the intervention or assistance of state actors. Movements will succeed when they find champions or alter the calculations of political authorities to induce action that will benefit the movement.

Working in this tradition, Barkan (1984) compared the outcomes of five major civil rights campaigns. He argues that success was driven by whether political authorities responded to protest with “legalistic” or “violent” strategies. Legalistic strategies included the arrest of large numbers of demonstrators as occurred famously in Albany, Georgia and the use lengthy and expensive litigation tactics. This response contained protest without offering substantive concessions. Violent strategies were in Birmingham and Selma where police beat and arrested

hundreds of demonstrators. Barkan, in contrast to Morris (1993), contends that violence backfired by bringing federal authorities to the aid of local movements.

Desegregation campaigns targeted economic actors and negotiation typically included business leaders (Jones and Long 1965). However, case studies of local movements suggest that political institutions and actors mattered. Police could arrest demonstrators, counter-demonstrators, or neither. Mayors or city council members could also become involved in seeking a resolution to local conflicts. There was significant variation in the political power and organization of white moderates (potential allies) and militant segregationists (opponents) (Black 1971; Thornton 1991). Thus, we give close consideration to local political conditions in our effort to test whether protest mattered.

Economic Opportunity

Recently scholars have begun investigating the relationship between social movements and economic outcomes (Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri 2007; King and Pearce 2010; King and Soule 2007; Schneiberg, King, and Smith 2008). The key insight emerging from this scholarship is that economic actors vary in responsiveness depending on firm and market characteristics including a firm's internal decision making processes and embeddedness in inter-firm relations (Schurman and Munro 2009; Weber, Rao, and Thomas 2009). This line of argument dovetails with a longer tradition of scholarship on strike success and Marxist accounts of protest movements (Griffin, Wallace, and Rubin 1986; Korpi and Shalev 1980; Schwartz 1976).

Luders develops an economic opportunity argument arguing that movement success depends on the vulnerability of targets to the costs movements impose (Luders 2006; 2010). Applying this perspective to local civil rights movements, Luders argues that desegregation outcomes can be explained by considering the combination of “concession” and “disruption” costs faced by business actors in a community. Movements must alter the calculations of economic actors by making the costs of disruption outweigh the costs of concessions – as when whites refuse to patronize a store that desegregates. For example, Luders argues that “sectoral variation in the target vulnerability affect’s a movement’s overall prospects for success against economic targets” (2010, p. 9). Some economic actors were much more vulnerable to the disruption costs of protest such as downtown businesses, sectors that depended on black customers, and affiliates of national companies whose reputations could be harmed outside the South. Other economic actors were less vulnerable including agriculture and manufacturing sectors. Organized white opposition raised concession costs because whites could punish businesses for compromising.

Some accounts of local desegregation lend support to this perspective by focusing on the varying responses of white business leaders to civil rights protest (Eskew 1997; Jacoway and Colburn 1982). In sum, desegregation should be more likely in cities with greater ties to national markets, larger retail sectors, and greater economic resources in the black community.

Summary

We argue that scholars largely agree about how protest matters emphasizing the ways that protest imposes costs on targets and mobilizes support from its constituency and bystanders. However, most efforts to test whether protest matters are limited either by focusing on a small number of

cases or aggregating data in ways that obscure the connection between protest and outcomes. Protest influence must be gauged alongside compelling alternative explanations. Specifically, we focus on movement infrastructure, political opportunity and economic opportunity perspectives as the most central, plausible, and well-developed theoretical accounts of movement success. The challenges to segregation provide an ideal setting to appraise theories of protest influence because the case has been central to the development of each argument.

Data and methods

We examine the impact of protest, movement organizations, political opportunity, and economic characteristics on the desegregation of lunch counters in 1960 and 1961. We investigate 334 cities at risk of desegregation, using archival sources and the 1960 Census to construct measures reflecting the central claims of each argument. We cover the eleven states of the former Confederacy, along with Maryland, Kentucky, and West Virginia. The unit of observation is an urban place having at least 10,000 people and 1,000 non-whites; only a handful of smaller places had sit-ins.⁵

Our approach differs from prior analyses of desegregation that rest on case studies. Barkan (1984) and Luders (2006), for instance, studied campaigns in five cities. Given their reliance on secondary sources, their cases are necessarily large cities which have been researched by historians. Morris (1993) collected original interviews, but focused primarily on Birmingham. This strategy prevents one from identifying patterns across the South and distinguishing the significance of protest from strong pre-existing organization, favorable political opportunities,

⁵ Sit-ins were not confined to the largest cities. They occurred in towns like DeLand, Florida and Monroe, North Carolina, each with 11,000 residents.

or vulnerable economic actors. Our strategy sacrifices the attention to interaction, but it has complementary advantages: providing greater comparative leverage, systematically testing alternative explanations, and avoiding drawing inferences from exceptional cases.

Dependent variable

The outcome we examine is the desegregation of lunch counters, which was the foremost demand of the sit-ins in spring 1960. While segregation shaped most aspects of public life in the South, lunch counters provided a particularly blatant example: stores enticed black customers to shop but then refused to allow them to dine. The stores were also more vulnerable targets, as they relied partly on black customers and the reputation of national chains could be tarnished outside the South. Therefore lunch counters were usually the first venues to be desegregated. In May 1963 the Department of Justice counted 204 cities as having desegregated at least one lunch counter. By comparison, hotels or motels had been desegregated in 163 cities, restaurants in 141, and theaters in 109 (Oberschall 1973, p. 225).

The progress of desegregation was documented by CORE. Having pioneered sit-ins in the North from the late 1940s, it became involved in the Southern movement immediately after the Greensboro sit-in (Meier and Rudwick 1975). Six reports from August 1960 to December 1961 listed “Cities where Lunch Counters of Drug, Variety, or Department Stores have opened since February 1, 1960” (CORE 1960-1961). By the end of 1961, it listed 90 of our 334 cities (as well as a few smaller towns). The Southern Regional Council (SRC) also listed “cities in which at least one establishment has desegregated its eating facilities” in September 1961 (1961). It counted 74 of our cities (as well as smaller towns). SRC and CORE provided the same

classification for 92% of cities, but CORE counted more cases of desegregation.⁶ We rely primarily on CORE because it enables us to trace change over time. However, we present cross-sectional analysis using both sources to confirm that our results are not an artifact of the particular source.

Table 1 calculates the hazard of desegregation: the probability of a segregated city ('at risk') undergoing desegregation by the end of the interval. Because the intervals vary in length, the daily hazard is more informative. We assume that the first interval commences on May 1, 1960, as the first instance of desegregation (Nashville, as mentioned) occurred early in that month. The pace of desegregation slowed noticeably after the fall of 1960. Even by the end of the period, only a quarter of all cities in the South had desegregated lunch counters. Figure 1 maps desegregation by the end of 1961. Two-thirds of cities in Virginia had desegregated lunch counters, while four states in the Deep South remained untouched.

[Table 1 and Figure 1 About Here]

Cross-sectional analysis

We use logistic regression to estimate the probability of desegregation by a certain date. Independent variables capture each city's characteristics. Cross-sectional variables include protest, movement organization, political opportunity, and economic opportunity. A multilevel

⁶ SRC excludes 19 cities that CORE identifies as desegregated by April 1961, while including 7 cities omitted by CORE in December 1961. They agree on 301 cities out of 327. The remaining 7 cities are indeterminate: CORE identified them as desegregated between April and December 1961, but this could have been before or after the compilation of SRC's report.

model with random effects by state offers no improvement. The Appendix provides descriptive statistics (Table A1), a correlation matrix (Table A2), and data sources (Table A3).

To test whether protest influenced desegregation, we code the occurrence of sit-ins—the physical occupation of space from which blacks were excluded. Beginning in February 1960, sit-ins took place in 66 out of the 334 cities by April 14 (Andrews and Biggs 2006). That date was the day before the Easter conference at Shaw University that brought together student activists who led the sit-ins. Most important, that period ends before any Southern city gained desegregated lunch counters. Sit-ins continued after Easter, of course. To determine whether this timeframe is defensible, we trace protest reported in the *New York Times*, focusing on protest for the rights of African Americans, targeted against businesses, taking the form of civil disobedience, and occurring in the South. Figure 2 shows the number of protesters, a total of around fourteen thousand.⁷ Half of that total came before Easter 1960. The remaining spikes come from two huge events in New Orleans (November 1960) and Atlanta (March 1961). Although the *New York Times* data covers a longer time period, it misses many cities where protest occurred. Before Easter 1960, it reported this kind of protest in only 34 out of 66 cities with sit-ins. We therefore prefer our geographically comprehensive measure of protest.

[Figure 2 About Here]

We also expect that sit-ins in nearby places would increase the probability of desegregation. We calculate the weighted sum of sit-ins that occurred in all other cities, the weight being the inverse

⁷ Data are from the Dynamics of Collective Action project described above. We exclude protest that occurred in a city after its lunch counters were desegregated.

square root of distance.⁸ El Paso, Texas was most remote from other cities with sit-ins; closest was Kannapolis, North Carolina. To identify whether geopolitical boundaries mattered, following recent work that distinguished boundaries from distance (Braun and Koopmans 2010), we enter separately the weighted sum for cities within the state and for cities beyond it.

To test the influence of movement organizations, we constructed five variables for movement organization on the eve of the sit-ins. The NAACP was dominant in membership and resources, with branches in 206 of our cities. Our variable is the number of members (averaged from 1957 and 1959), transformed by taking the square root. Separate from the NAACP's branches were Youth Councils and College Chapters, and we define a variable for the presence of each (in either 1958 or 1959). For SCLC, a variable is defined for the presence of an affiliated organization or member of the Executive Board (in February 1960). For CORE, we code the presence of a Chapter that had applied to affiliate with the national organization (by the beginning of 1960).

We test political opportunity/mediation arguments using six indicators – one at the state and five at the local level. These measures gauge the relevant aspects of the political environment including elite allies, counter-movement strength, and past repression. The presence of white moderates is captured by affiliates of the Southern Regional Council in the city (in 1955). Four other variables measure the inverse of political opportunities: the strength of racial oppression. We measure the presence of segregationist organizations in the county using an indicators constructed by Matthews and Prothro (1966: 164) from media sources, records of national and

⁸ A few of the cities are very close to one another. Because the inverse square root would give excessive weight to these cases, distances less than 10 miles are treated as 10 miles.

state organizations, and correspondence with local experts. Segregationist electoral strength is measured by the percentage of the county's electorate voting for strict segregationist candidates for Governor in the most recent election. Candidates' views on segregation follow Black's (1971) coding of campaign speeches. Past racial violence in the county is measured as an indicator for any violence that occurred from 1955 through 1958; reports were compiled from multiple media sources (American Friends Service Committee 1959). (These three variables—racial violence, segregationist vote, and segregationist organization—are imputed for three states, as explained in the Appendix.) A final variable is the percentage of blacks in the population, often used as a proxy for the degree of racial oppression. As Key (1949: 5) observed, “the hard core of the political South ... is made up of these counties and sections of the southern states in which Negroes constitute a substantial proportion of the population.” An orthogonal squared term is also entered for this variable, to check for non-linearity.⁹

We include a sixth indicator of political opportunity at the state level. With fourteen states, only a single variable is feasible. States of the Deep South—Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina—are characterized by a substantial black population (Matthews and Prothro 1966: 169). We construct a scale of racial oppression by taking the percentage of blacks, multiplied by the percentage of the population born in the South (Black and Black 1987: 17).¹⁰ The latter term incorporates in-migration to Florida and Maryland in particular. The product (rescaled to 0-100) ranges from West Virginia (4) to Mississippi (40); it is strongly associated with the conventional dichotomy between Deep and Upper South ($\eta^2 = .72$). An

⁹ We experimented with the percentage of blacks registered to vote and the ratio of black to white registered voters, but neither has an effect.

¹⁰ As defined by the Census, the South extends to Delaware, the District of Columbia, and Oklahoma.

alternative would be to measure support for segregation among whites, but it is difficult to find relevant survey questions answered by enough respondents in each state. Gallup polls from 1956 to 1959 asked white respondents whether they would vote for a Negro president, and whether they approved of the Supreme Court's ruling against school segregation. Combining eight polls (2631 respondents) yields a measure of progressive opinion.¹¹ Unfortunately its association with the conventional dichotomy is weak ($\eta^2 = .29$), and it is less plausible—placing North Carolina on a level with Alabama and Georgia. Negative answers to the questions apparently fail to differentiate between mild and extreme racism. Therefore we prefer our demographic scale. An orthogonal squared term is also entered for this variable.

We test central claims of the economic opportunity argument including ties to national markets, labor force composition, and the economic characteristics of the black community. Vulnerability to protest is measured by two indicators of ties to national markets (James 1988). One is the proportion of the employed population working for large corporations. The other indicator is the presence of local affiliates of the AFL-CIO. Both variables should reduce support for local segregation. Another variable captures the percentage of the labor force employed in eating, drinking and other retail establishments, which we expect to increase the probability of desegregation. We include three measures of the black community's purchasing power: black median income (logged), the percentage unskilled among the black male employed, and the percentage unemployed.

¹¹ Polls # 576, 586, 589, 602, 604, 611, 614, 622, from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

Control variables are entered for the black population and for the number of black college students, who comprised the majority of sit-in protesters. Both variables are logged.

Event-history analysis

We use event-history analysis to test our expectation that the occurrence of desegregation in some cities makes desegregation more likely in other cities nearby. We use a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the hazard of desegregation. We estimate h_{ip} , the hazard of desegregation in city i during interval p , by complementary log-log regression (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008, pp. 354-62):

$$h_{ip} = 1 - \exp\left(-\exp\left(\sum \alpha_q P_{qp} + \sum \beta_k X_{ki} + \sum \delta_m D_{mip}\right)\right)$$

To absorb changes in the baseline hazard, P_{qp} are binary variables coded 1 if $q = p$ and 0 otherwise, and α_q are the associated parameters. The characteristics of each city are measured by cross-sectional variables described above, X_k , with parameters β_k . Previous desegregation elsewhere is measured by D_{ip} , with parameter δ . Observations for the same city at different intervals are not independent, of course, and so robust standard errors are estimated with clustering by city. A multilevel model with shared frailty (random intercepts) at city and state levels offers no improvement.

Analyzing the effect of prior desegregation is complicated by the division of time into intervals (Table 1). In the second interval, for example, twelve cities desegregated. We can assess the effect of desegregation that occurred in the first interval, but not in the second, even though the twelfth event could have been influenced also by the previous eleven instances of desegregation in that interval. Within the first interval, indeed, we cannot estimate any effect of prior

desegregation. Excluding this interval reduces the number of cities to 291 (334 - 43) and city-intervals to 1350 (1684 - 343). The variable D_{pi} uses the weighted sum of cities previously desegregated, the weight being the inverse square root of distance, as for sit-ins. The variable should also incorporate the inertial force exerted by cities maintaining segregation, and so we use a simple difference between the two sums:

$$D_{ip} = \left(\sum_{\pi=1}^{p-1} \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^J \frac{1 - s_{j\pi}}{\sqrt{d_{ij}}} \right) - \left(\sum_{\pi=1}^{p-1} \sum_{j=1, j \neq i}^J \frac{s_{j\pi}}{\sqrt{d_{ij}}} \right)$$

where $s_{j\pi}$ is 1 if city j 's lunch counters are segregated in interval π , otherwise 0.¹² The variable is The minimum is for Atlanta, Georgia in the second interval; the maximum is for South Norfolk, Virginia, in the sixth interval.

Results

To begin with the bivariate association between sit-ins and desegregation, Figure 3 depicts the proportion of cities with desegregated lunch counters (comparing CORE and SRC). In cities where sit-ins had occurred before Easter, over a third had desegregated lunch counters by August 1960, when college students returned after their summer vacation. The strong association between sit-ins and desegregation does not demonstrate a causal relationship, of course. It could be that sit-ins occurred where the movement was well organized or where political or economic opportunity was greater, and in those places segregation was more easily overcome.

[Figure 3 About Here]

¹² Multiplying the first sum by a factor such as 2 or 3, thus weighting desegregation more than segregation, makes no discernible differences to the results.

Before presenting our model for desegregation, Model 1 of Table 2 takes the occurrence of sit-ins as the dependent variable. This event-history model replicates Andrews and Biggs (2006: Model 2) with additional economic and political variables. This allows us to directly compare the factors that explain the occurrence of protest and desegregation. The model takes into account the diffusion of sit-ins within the period from February 1 to Easter, but here we focus on cross-sectional variables. First, the presence of CORE significantly increases the hazard of sit-ins. Taken individually, other organizations do not have statistically significant effects. At the same time, though, we cannot reject the hypothesis that all four activist organizations—NAACP Youth Councils and College Chapters, SCLC, and CORE—had the same effect ($p = .65$). The membership of adult NAACP branches, however, had no discernible effect. Second, the demographic proxies for political opportunities are powerful. At the local level, there is a pronounced non-monotonic relationship with proportion black: sit-ins are most likely in cities where blacks made up about 30% of the population, and least likely where blacks comprise a majority or a minority. At the state level, there is a more straightforward negative association with our scale for racial oppression. Third, one of the economic variables has a significant effect. The proportion of blacks confined to unskilled occupations significantly reduces the hazard of sit-ins. Finally, college students greatly increased the hazard.

[Table 2 About Here]

Models 2 to 4 take desegregation as the dependent variable, using logistic regression. Model 2 measures desegregation at the end of 1960. Sit-ins have a strong relationship, even controlling

for many factors which predict sit-ins. A city where sit-ins occurred at the beginning of 1960 has more than triple the odds of desegregation. Sit-ins elsewhere also have a positive effect. This effect is statistically significant only within the state (though we cannot be sure that the two coefficients are equal, $p = .12$). Figure 4 shows how the occurrence of sit-ins in one additional city would increase the odds of desegregation. Among movement organizations, we only find support for NAACP membership. Increasing NAACP members from 22 (in the median city) to 354 (in the 90th percentile city), would triple the odds of desegregation. This finding contrasts with the finding for sit-ins (Model 1), where CORE and possibly other activist organizations were important, but NAACP was not. The effect of CORE on desegregation is estimated to be large, but it is not statistically significant.¹³

[Figure 4 About Here]

We find support for one indicator of political opportunity at the local level. A city with segregationist organizations has only one-sixth the odds of desegregation. Our proxy for political opportunity at the state level is less straightforward. Desegregation is least likely in the most oppressive states, of course. What is unexpected is that the probability of desegregation peaks for a state like Maryland, and then declines somewhat in the least oppressive border states like West Virginia. Possibly the black population in such states was too small (5%) to mount an effective challenge to segregation. The only element of economic opportunity to reach statistical significance has the wrong sign: the proportion of blacks in unskilled occupations actually increases the probability of desegregation. This variable had the opposite effect on sit-ins, of

¹³ Substituting a single binary variable for the presence of any activist organization (NAACP Youth Council or College Chapter, SCLC, or CORE) does not yield a significant effect.

course (Model 1). The explanation for this result is unclear. None of the variables pertaining to the white business community have any discernible effect. Finally, black college students made desegregation more likely. Increasing their number from 16 (median) to 467 (90th percentile) would more than triple the odds of desegregation.

Model 3 advances a year, taking desegregation at the end of 1961. Although we might expect the effect of sit-ins in early 1960 to diminish with the passage of time, they remain powerful predictors of desegregation (see Figure 4). The only notable difference is that the black population now has a positive and statistically significant effect. Doubling the black population would multiply the odds of desegregation by 1.7.

CORE's listing of desegregation can be checked against SRC's in Model 4. The effect of sit-ins is undiminished. With these data, moreover, sit-ins have a significant impact on cities outside the state (see Figure 4). SRC recorded seven more desegregated cities in Kentucky, which increases the estimated influence of sit-ins in surrounding states. The movement infrastructure argument is not supported in this model. The effect of NAACP membership is smaller and no longer statistically significant. Political opportunity is further supported because another aspect of political opportunity emerges as statistically significant. Where blacks comprised a small minority of the city's population, desegregation was more likely. Reducing the black percentage from 23% (the median) to 7% (the tenth percentile) would more than double the odds of desegregation. Economic opportunity gains modest support. The probability of desegregation increased with the size of the retail sector. Increasing its proportion of employment from 15% to 18% doubles the odds of desegregation.

Model 5 in Table 3 shows our event-history analysis for cities at risk of desegregation from mid-August, excluding 43 cities desegregated in the first interval. The exponentiated coefficients are interpreted as hazard ratios in continuous time, as normal for the Cox proportional hazards model.¹⁴ The spatial diffusion argument is strongly supported. Previous desegregation in nearby cities increases the hazard of desegregation. This result does not merely reflect any increasing probability of desegregation over time, because changes in the baseline hazard are already taken into account (by $\sum \alpha_q P_{qp}$). To illustrate the magnitude of this effect, consider desegregation by April 1961 (before the sixth interval). Averaging by state, places in Alabama were farthest from desegregated cities, while places in Maryland were closest. Shifting location from the former to the latter—holding constant all other characteristics of the city—would multiply the hazard of desegregation twenty-fold.

[Table 3 About Here]

Comparing Model 5 to Model 3, there are two notable differences. The effect of sit-ins, in the city and elsewhere, is not quite statistically significant at the .05 level. NAACP membership is also not statistically significant. These differences are due to the inclusion of prior desegregation as an independent variable, as well as the omission of cities desegregated before mid-August 1960—about half of the total instances of desegregation.

In sum, we find strong evidence that disruptive protest did make a difference. Sit-ins helped to bring about desegregation, not just in the city where they happened but also in surrounding cities.

¹⁴ The table omits the five binary variables which absorb changes in the baseline hazard over time.

This demonstrated impact is remarkable given the inclusion of variables predicting the occurrence of sit-ins.

One potential objection to these findings is that our demographic proxy for political opportunity does not fully capture differences across states. To check whether the results are robust, Model 3 may be estimated with fixed effects for states. Four states without any instance of desegregation are dropped, of course, for lacking within-state variation ($N = 247$). In this more severe test, the effect of sit-ins elsewhere is far from statistically significant (though the estimated effect is very similar). But the occurrence of sit-ins in the city more than quadruple the odds of desegregation ($p = .01$).

Discussion and Conclusions

The civil rights campaigns to desegregate lunch counters provide an opportunity to evaluate the impact of protest. The case itself has strong theoretical and substantive importance given its centrality in movement studies. Activists, scholars, and many others draw lessons about the efficacy of protest from this case. Unfortunately, most attention centers on a handful of well-studied campaigns, charismatic leaders, and major federal policies. Scholars have paid particular attention to the links between celebrated campaigns in Birmingham and Selma as catalysts for the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act, respectively (Garrow 1978). Protest was far more diffuse and a large share targeted local businesses rather than federal policymakers. Ultimately, the civil rights movement built momentum for federal policy reform through numerous sustained campaigns at the local level. Our analysis provides an important corrective

by documenting the impact of local protest across numerous cities well before passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Despite a surge in research on the consequences of movements, most studies examine the movement impact by focusing on characteristics of movement organizations. Among those that study protest, many find that disruptive protest has no direct effect. Moreover, many research designs make it difficult to appraise the impact of movements by employing aggregated measures of organizations or protest activity over large geographic areas or time periods. By situating the sit-in campaigns in their local context, we have gauged the extent to which protest was responsible for eroding segregation. We have also examined whether protest and desegregation in nearby cities increased the likelihood of desegregation. Our findings regarding the impact of protest are striking given the inclusion of numerous factors that account for protest occurrence.

We find that movement success diffused to nearby cities over time even in the absence of protest in a city. This pattern challenges the conventional practice of examining the characteristics of movement activity in isolation from what is occurring in other locales. Scholars will need to pay increasing attention to spatial processes in studies of movement consequences, and this task will be aided by the increasing access to GIS data and spatial analysis tools (Downey 2006). Taken together, the impact of protest and the spatial diffusion of movement success underscore our call for spatially and temporally disaggregating the analysis of movement consequences. Moreover, our analysis confirms the advantages of building datasets on a large number of campaigns with alongside relevant measures of social, political, and economic contexts.

Our findings regarding the impact of protest campaigns are robust in that we include measures for movement infrastructure, political mediation, and economic opportunity. Movement infrastructure arguments focus on organizational and strategic capacity of movements. By comparison, theories of political and economic opportunity focus on exogenous factors that may enhance or diminish a movement's likelihood of success. Comparing across 334 Southern cities, we find support for a key aspect of the movement infrastructure argument. Specifically, our analyses show that protest organizations like CORE operating as activist cadres facilitate the spread of protest while established, membership organizations are important for securing movement gains. Although scholars have suggested that a tactical division of labor occurs in movements, this study provides an important test of and support for this claim. We also find modest support for political and economic opportunity arguments. We find that white segregationist organizations have a negative impact on the likelihood of desegregation. The measures of political opportunity that capture the most central ideas in the theory – elite allies and political access points – are not significant.

We provide mixed support for prior analyses of the civil rights movement and the desegregation of public accommodations. Our findings regarding spatial diffusion are consistent with Wright's argument that business owners resisted desegregation not out of ideological commitment but because they "harbored fears of being undercut by still-segregated rivals in competition for affluent white customers" (2008. p. 15). News that businesses were desegregating in nearby cities, with minimal economic harm, would have aided the spread of desegregation. Consistent with Morris's (1993) account of the Birmingham campaign, we find that local protest was crucial

in securing favorable outcomes, and we find some evidence to support Morris's claim that the strength of local movement organizations mattered for these outcomes. Our analyses challenge the argument that cities with stronger ties to the national economy were more likely to desegregate (although we do find that desegregation is more likely in cities with a larger retail sector) protest success depended on the characteristics of white-owned businesses) (Jacoway and Colburn 1982; Luders 2006). We suspect these differences hinge on our systematic analysis of all Southern cities, rather than a selective subset.

Desegregation of public accommodations has three important characteristics that define the scope conditions of our analysis and theoretical claims. Most important, we consider an outcome where the target had the capacity to respond directly to movement demands. Even with chain stores, the national headquarters of companies like Kress and Woolworth deferred to local managers. In this way, desegregation of public accommodations differs from other outcomes such as school desegregation where federal intervention was more decisive for local outcomes (Andrews 2004; Luders 2010). Moreover, we suspect that organization building was more crucial in rural areas of the South where persistent repression made disruptive protest too dangerous to launch successfully (Andrews 2004; Payne 1995). Third, the sit-ins unfolded as a wave of protest that diffused rapidly throughout the South. Local protest campaigns that occur in isolation or in smaller clusters may fail to generate the kind of leverage observed here. Taken together, these characteristics capture many important social movements, and further research should examine how these conditions alter the capacity of protest to generate change.

We should highlight two important limitations of our study and analysis that point toward future directions in our own and others work. First, scholars have shifted to more complex measures of movement outcomes that differentiate among stages of the policy process (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Andrews 2001; Soule and King 2006). In our case, we were limited to a single indicator of movement impact. Arguably, theories may have greater leverage differentiating among more refined measures of the breadth or durability of desegregation. Second, scholars have begun to document the process through which movement impact occurs leading to new insights regarding the interactions between movements and targets (Ganz 2000; McCammon, Chaudhuri, Hewitt, Muse, Newman, Smith, and Terrell 2008). Thus, subsequent work on the desegregation process may uncover important pathways through which movement actors and their targets shaped the outcomes. Despite these limitations, the findings presented here suggest that protest campaigns may be more consequential than is typically assumed, and they open new questions for subsequent research on movement impact.

APPENDIX

Three variables—segregationist vote, segregationist organization, and racial violence—are available only for the Confederate states, and are therefore missing for 31 cities (9.3%) in the border states of Kentucky, Maryland, and West Virginia. These missing values are imputed as follows. We first treat these as dependent variables, using ordinary least squares regression or logistic regression to predict values for cities in the Confederate States. Independent variables are the logarithm of white population, the percentage of the state’s farm acreage under cotton at the peak of cotton production (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1932), and this percentage squared. These variables do not appear in our main analysis, of course. The equations perform modestly well at prediction. R^2 for segregationist vote is .25. The area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (.5 indicates no discrimination, while 1 indicates perfect discrimination) is .80 for segregationist organization and .70 for racial violence. We then use these equations to impute missing values—predicted probability for the binary variables—for cities in the border states. We have checked this solution in two ways. Omitting these three variables altogether makes no significant difference to the results. Dropping the border states makes no difference to the results for these three variables.

[Tables A1, A2, and A3 About Here]

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Figure 1: Sit-ins and Lunch Counter Desegregation Status (December 1961)




Figure 2: Civil disobedience against private racial segregation in the South, 1960-1961 (NYT)




Figure 3: Desegregation in the American South, 1960-1961




Figure 4: How sit-ins in another city would affect desegregation




Table 1: Desegregation in the South, May 1960 to December 1961

<i>Interval ending</i>	<i>Cities at risk</i>	<i>Cities desegregated</i>	<i>Daily hazard^a</i>	<i>Cities previously desegregated</i>
15 Aug 1956	334	43	.138%	0
12 Sep 1956	291	12	.154%	43
4 Oct 1956	279	6	.100%	55
7 Dec 1956	273	17	.104%	61
9 Apr 1957	256	5	.016%	78
18 Dec 1957	251	7	.011%	83
Total	1684	90		

^a Calculated using actuarial adjustment, and assuming first interval begins on 1 May

Table 2: Determinants of sitins and desegregation in the South, 1960-1961

	<i>Initial sitin</i>			<i>Desegregation</i>								
	<i>1 February - 14 April 1960</i>			<i>December 1960 (CORE)</i>			<i>December 1961 (CORE)</i>			<i>September 1961 (SRC)</i>		
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	hazard	s.e.	p	odds	s.e.	p	odds	s.e.	p	odds	s.e.	p
Sitin, 1 February - 14 April 1960				3.24	1.84	.04 *	4.32	2.42	.01 **	6.45	3.79	.00 **
Other cities in state with sitins weighted by $\sqrt{\text{distance}}$				5.43	2.53	.00 ***	2.78	1.05	.01 **	5.93	2.58	.00 ***
Other cities beyond state with sitins weighted by $\sqrt{\text{distance}}$				1.88	1.14	.30	1.38	.80	.58	4.74	3.03	.01 *
NAACP members ($\sqrt{\text{v}}$)	1.00	.01	.85	1.08	.04	.03 *	1.10	.04	.01 *	1.06	.04	.13
NAACP Youth Council	2.02	.74	.06	.80	.39	.65	.65	.31	.37	.85	.44	.76
NAACP College Chapter	2.20	1.02	.09	.87	.98	.90	.56	.61	.60	1.16	1.36	.90
SCLC affiliate	1.26	.53	.59	.19	.20	.12	.14	.15	.06	.31	.32	.26
CORE Chapter	2.92	1.35	.02 *	6.49	8.87	.17	2.06	2.71	.58	.62	.81	.72
SRC presence	1.64	.67	.23	1.10	.58	.86	.64	.34	.40	1.30	.68	.62
Segregationist organization in county	1.39	.53	.39	.16	.10	.00 **	.25	.14	.02 *	.43	.26	.16
Racial violence in county	1.17	.43	.67	1.58	.85	.39	1.02	.53	.98	1.73	.95	.32
Strict segregationist % of gubernatorial vote in county	.40	.23	.11	.99	.01	.12	1.00	.01	.76	1.00	.01	.72
Black %	1.02	.02	.17	.96	.02	.09	.97	.02	.14	.94	.03	.03 *
Black %, squared orthogonal	1.00	.00	.01 *	1.00	.00	.50	1.00	.00	.38	1.00	.00	.61
Black % of state \times % born in South	.92	.02	.00 ***	.71	.08	.00 **	.80	.05	.00 ***	.80	.06	.00 **
Black % of state \times % born in South, squared orthogonal	.81	.16	.28	.15	.10	.00 **	.22	.11	.00 **	.45	.21	.09
Employment in large corporations as % of county	.08	.28	.47	.96	.03	.30	.98	.03	.49	.98	.03	.63
Labor union density	1.55	.37	.07	1.40	.40	.23	1.14	.33	.65	1.42	.44	.26
Retail/hospitality % of labor force	5.14	38.72	.83	1.03	.10	.77	1.00	.09	.96	1.24	.13	.04 *
Black male median income (logged)	1.61	1.49	.61	3.35	3.28	.22	3.39	3.19	.19	2.70	2.83	.34
Black unskilled %	.95	.02	.02 *	1.07	.03	.00 **	1.07	.03	.01 **	1.06	.03	.03 *
Black unemployed %	.90	.05	.08	1.04	.06	.48	.99	.06	.89	1.01	.06	.88
Black college students (logged)	1.79	.24	.00 ***	1.42	.25	.05 *	1.34	.22	.08	1.15	.21	.45
Black population (logged)	.83	.22	.47	1.19	.46	.66	2.16	.83	.04 *	2.27	.95	.05
N	18,990 city-days, 334 cities			334 cities			334 cities			334 cities		

hazard: hazard ratio; odds: odds ratio; s.e.: standard error (robust adjusted for clustering on city in Model 1); p: p-value (two-tailed) *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
 Model 1 estimated by rare events logistic regression, diffusion variables not shown; Models 2-4 estimated by logistic regression

Table 3: Determinants of desegregation in the South, 1960-1961

	<i>August 1960 - December 1961</i>		
	Model 5		
	hazard	s.e.	p
Sitin, 1 February - 14 April 1960	2.55	1.32	.07
Other cities in state with sitins weighted by $\sqrt{\text{distance}}$	2.17	.86	.05
Other cities beyond state with sitins weighted by $\sqrt{\text{distance}}$	3.19	2.26	.10
NAACP members ($\sqrt{\text{ }}$)	1.05	.03	.10
NAACP Youth Council	.74	.36	.53
NAACP College Chapter	1.09	1.24	.94
SCLC affiliate	.52	.47	.47
CORE Chapter	7.29	11.76	.22
SRC presence	.35	.22	.10
Racial violence had occurred in county	.74	.35	.53
Segregationist % of gubernatorial vote in county	.99	.01	.10
Presence of segregationist organization in county	.23	.13	.01 **
Black %	.98	.03	.51
Black % (squared orthogonal)	1.00	.00	.11
Black % of state \times % born in South	.86	.04	.00 ***
Black % of state \times % born in South (squared orthogonal)	.26	.13	.01 **
Employment in large corporations as % of county	.96	.04	.27
Labor union density	1.24	.30	.37
Retail/hospitality % of labor force	1.17	.14	.20
Black male median income (logged)	1.89	1.87	.52
Black unskilled %	1.09	.03	.00 **
Black unemployed %	.99	.05	.86
Black college students (logged)	1.41	.25	.05
Black population (logged)	2.30	.90	.03 *
Desegregation relative to segregation in other cities weighted by $\sqrt{\text{distance}}$	1.76	.36	.01 **
N	1350 city-intervals, 291 cities		

Hazard: hazard ratio; s.e.: robust standard error (adjusted for clustering on city);

p: p-value (two-tailed) *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

Cox proportional hazards models (interval-censored) estimated by complementary log-log regression

Table A1: Descriptive statistics

<i>Independent variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>S.D.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
<i>334 cities</i>				
(1) Sitin, 1 February - 14 April 1960	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
(2) Other cities in state with sitins weighted by $\sqrt{\text{distance}}$	0.58	0.60	0.00	2.53
(3) Other cities beyond state with sitins weighted by $\sqrt{\text{distance}}$	2.88	0.55	1.66	4.27
(4) NAACP members ($\sqrt{\text{ }}$)	7.66	11.57	0.00	102.59
(5) NAACP Youth Council	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00
(6) NAACP College Chapter	0.04	0.21	0.00	1.00
(7) SCLC affiliate	0.07	0.25	0.00	1.00
(8) CORE Chapter	0.04	0.19	0.00	1.00
(9) SRC presence	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
(10) Segregationist organization in county	0.36	0.46	0.00	1.00
(11) Racial violence in county	0.28	0.43	0.00	1.00
(12) Strict segregationist % of gubernatorial vote in county	61.26	32.79	4.62	100.00
(13) Black %	24.75	12.93	1.67	65.96
(14) Black %, squared orthogonal	0.00	191.42	-171.29	1352.62
(15) Black % of state x % born in South	19.90	9.39	4.33	40.20
(16) Black % of state x % born in South, squared orthogonal	0.00	1.00	-1.01	2.93
(17) Employment in large corporations as % of county	4.15	5.79	0.00	54.69
(18) Labor union density	0.86	0.76	0.00	4.37
(19) Retail/hospitality % of labor force	14.70	2.64	5.80	22.70
(20) Black male median income (logged)	7.55	0.26	6.67	8.47
(21) Black unskilled %	50.13	8.63	22.42	79.89
(22) Black unemployed %	8.45	4.17	0.00	29.46
(23) Black college students (logged)	3.02	1.97	0.00	8.23
(24) Black population (logged)	8.74	1.10	6.91	12.70
<i>1350 city-intervals</i>				
(25) Desegregation relative to segregation in other cities weighted by $\sqrt{\text{distance}}$	-11.85	3.19	-20.6	-5.0

Table A2: Correlation matrix

	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)		
<i>334 cities</i>																										
(2)	.33																									
(3)	.13	-.02																								
(4)	.51	.15	.06																							
(5)	.44	.21	-.02	.60																						
(6)	.40	.24	.09	.43	.30																					
(7)	.38	-.04	.06	.33	.18	.29																				
(8)	.35	.01	.19	.31	.26	.19	.21																			
(9)	.44	.08	.15	.35	.26	.29	.36	.21																		
(10)	.10	-.14	.08	.15	.10	.05	.28	.13	.11																	
(11)	.19	-.01	.08	.24	.18	.16	.28	.17	.14	.35																
(12)	.00	-.13	.59	.02	-.06	.00	.04	.18	.11	.03	.06															
(13)	.18	.02	.16	.11	.03	.14	.20	.07	.17	.18	.12	.19														
(14)	-.19	-.18	-.06	-.14	-.14	-.08	-.08	-.08	-.12	.03	.02	.05	.00													
(15)	-.03	-.07	.44	-.12	-.09	.04	.10	.03	.05	.35	.12	.15	.44	-.07												
(16)	-.15	-.41	-.11	-.05	.00	-.14	-.01	.09	-.12	.25	.15	.27	-.03	.15	.00											
(17)	-.05	.03	.31	.01	.01	.00	-.05	-.01	.03	.00	-.05	.17	-.01	-.04	.14	-.06										
(18)	.05	-.20	.07	.10	.11	-.01	.04	.02	-.02	.09	.06	.08	.11	-.01	.02	.25	.11									
(19)	-.13	-.23	-.37	-.11	-.13	-.09	-.05	-.04	-.13	-.03	-.09	-.04	.00	.00	-.08	.26	-.24	.08								
(20)	.14	.15	-.18	.29	.21	.11	.06	.05	.05	.02	.13	-.08	-.31	.05	-.31	-.02	.13	-.05	-.25							
(21)	-.28	-.11	-.17	-.22	-.16	-.17	-.15	-.11	-.05	-.17	-.07	-.03	-.32	.06	-.21	.00	.03	.04	.01	-.03						
(22)	-.12	-.20	-.02	-.13	-.14	-.11	-.01	-.06	-.14	.14	-.07	-.15	.23	.00	.17	.01	-.08	.02	.22	-.34	-.12					
(23)	.53	.04	-.02	.54	.41	.41	.42	.23	.48	.29	.31	-.07	.28	-.14	.04	-.01	-.10	.05	-.02	.16	-.24	-.03				
(24)	.48	.00	.01	.65	.45	.34	.45	.24	.48	.28	.30	.00	.50	-.19	.15	-.05	-.06	.09	-.04	.15	-.29	.04	.75			
<i>1350 city-intervals</i>																										
(25)	-.01	.24	-.30	.06	.10	-.07	-.11	-.01	-.14	-.13	-.10	-.12	-.27	.17	-.47	.06	-.03	-.07	.07	.24	.00	-.08	-.14	-.22		

Table A3: Description and Sources for Variables

Variable Name	Description	Source
NAACP members	Average number of members of NAACP chapter, 1957 and 1959	NAACP Papers, Reel 3, Total 1957 Memberships and Freedom Fund Contributions Received from Branches, Reel 124, Total 1959 Memberships and Freedom Fund Contributions Received.
NAACP Youth Council	1 if city has NAACP youth chapter, 1958 or 1959	NAACP Papers, Reel 14, Total 1958 Youth Membership Received, Youth and Student Memberships Received from Region V During 1959, Youth and Student Memberships Received from Region VI During 1959, Statement of Virginia Youth Memberships
NAACP College Chapter	1 if city has NAACP College Chapter, 1958 or 1959	
SCLC affiliate	1 if city has SCLC affiliate(s) or is represented on the SCLC Executive Board, February 3, 1960	SCLC Papers, Reel 1, Part 2, Affiliates of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, INC., February 3, 1960.
CORE Chapter	1 if city has CORE Chapter at the beginning of 1960	CORE Papers, multiple reels; Meier & Rudwick 1973:83-92
Southern Regional Council (SRC)	Number of SRC-affiliated leaders, 1955	Southern Regional Council Papers, Reel 75, State Organizations, officer lists, Feb. 4 1953 - Dec. 31, 1967, n.d., "SRC Affiliated Organizations", 1955.
Racial violence has occurred in county	Incidents of reported violence by whites against blacks, 1955-1959 (missing for Kentucky, Maryland, West Virginia)	Mathews and Prothro Southern County Data 1966; Incidents were originally published in a report published by the American Friends Service Committee et al., titled Intimidation, Reprisal, and Violence in the South's Racial Crisis, 1960.
Segregationist % of gubernatorial vote in county	Percentage of vote cast for segregationist candidates as categorized by Black	Black 1971; Bartley and Graham 1972
Presence of segregationist organization in county	Whether segregation existed in county	Mathews and Prothro Southern County Data 1966
Poll tax (state)	Whether the state had a poll tax	Mathews and Prothro Southern County Data 1966, Key 1950, Keyssar 2000
Employment in large corporations as % of county	Establishments of Fortune 1000 companies	Fortune, Plant and Product Directory, Volume 1, 1966.
Labor union density	Number of AFL-CIO Locals / total employed	U.S. Department of Labor, Register of Reporting Labor Organizations, June 30, 1960, 1960.
Retail/hospitality as % of labor force	Proportion of the labor force employed in "eating and drinking places" and "other retail trade"	U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960, table 75

Table A3 Continued

Variable Name	Description	Source
Black male median income (logged)	Median individual income of nonwhite males in 1959	U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960, table 78
Black unskilled %	Nonwhite males in unskilled occupations (private household, other service, farm laborer - excluding unpaid and farm foremen, other laborers) / nonwhite males in civilian labor force, 1960	U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960, table 78
Black unemployed %	Unemployed nonwhite males / nonwhite males in civilian labor force, 1960	U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960, table 77
Black college students	Nonwhites enrolled in college, 1960	U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1963, table 77
Black population	Nonwhite population, 1960	U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960, table 21
Black % of county	Nonwhite population / total population, 1960	U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960, table 21
Sit-in spring 1960	Whether a sit-in campaign was launched between February 1 and April 14, 1960	Multiple sources; see [self citation omitted]
Desegregation of Lunch Counters	Whether lunch counters of drug, variety or departments were desegregated	Papers of the Congress of racial Equality, 1946-1967, Series 5, Reel 26